Knowledge that Transforms

Why do firms allow their executives to accept outside directorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outside directorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.

Contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity but may exacerbate the agency problems of debt. We present evidence that the agency costs of debt may have declined during the 1990s. Specifically, changes in the financial characteristics of our sample firms suggest that underinvestment, asset substitution, and financial distress became less likely. Furthermore, agency costs of equity increased during the 1990s, primarily because firms became more difficult to monitor. Together, the findings provide an explanation for why more firms used option-based compensation in the latter 1990s, and why the proportion of options in compensation structure increased throughout the decade of the 1990s.

We argue that outsiders are handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best insider) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies are that a firm will be more likely to choose an insider to succeed to the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to insiders, and where there are more inside candidates. We assess these predictions using a data set containing more than 1,000 observations on CEO succession in large U.S. firms over the period 1974–1995 and a novel measure of the comparability of insiders that identifies those firms with a product or line of business organizational structure. Our evidence is consistent with each prediction. We also explore more carefully our organizational structure variable. We find that where firms switch to a product or line of business structure (making insiders more comparable) the likelihood of outsider succession falls. And we consider the possibility that managers from firms with a product or line of business structure may be more likely to be chosen CEO because their experience as divisional head better prepares them for a CEO's duties. Two tests suggest that this is not the source of our finding that these firms are more likely to promote insiders to be CEO. The first test finds that controlling for prior experience managing a business (a division or a firm) among inside candidates to be CEO, those firms organized along product lines remain more likely to promote from within. The second test finds that when outsiders are chosen CEO, these outsiders do not come disproportionately from firms with a product or line of business structure.

This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets extgreater2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance”, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors.

We focus on the relations among inside ownership, board composition, unaffiliated block ownership, and compensation structure for a sample of firms following their IPOs. Specifically, we follow firms for up to eleven years after their IPOs and examine the full sample and subsamples of firms that survive, are acquired, or that file for bankruptcy during the sample period. We find that as CEO ownership declines, board independence, board seats held by venture capitalists, and unaffiliated block ownership increase. Our findings suggest that as inside ownership decreases alternative governance mechanisms evolve to help mitigate the resulting increase in agency costs. Interestingly, the associations between CEO ownership, the fraction of venture capital board membership, and unaffiliated block ownership exist only for firms that survive over the eleven-year sample period.

Contrary to arguments that poison pills degrade firm performance, we find that operating performance modestly improves during the 5-year period after pill adoption. Performance improvements are present in a wide range of firms, and are independent of adoption year and whether the firm is R&D intensive. Although recent arguments suggest that the protection offered by pills is strongest when combined with a staggered board, the performance changes also are unrelated to board structure. This evidence undermines the widely held view that poison pills have systematically negative effects on firm performance.

We consider the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance. In an optimal contracting model, we show that the relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits of investment, as in theories of managerial entrenchment. We estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. We provide new results showing that investment is increasing in incentives. Further, in contrast to previous studies, we find that firm performance is increasing in incentives at all levels of incentives. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with theories of overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment.

Applying the Coase Theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from consent to unilateral divorce laws will not affect divorce rates. I show that existing evidence suggesting large effects of divorce laws on divorce rates reflect a failure to explicitly model the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the legal regime. When accounting for these dynamics, I find that unilateral divorce spiked following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but that this rise largely reversed itself within a decade. Overall, these changes in family law explain very little of the rise in divorce over the past half-century.

This paper develops a simple duopoly model in which investments in R&D and patents are inputs in the production of firm rents. Patents are necessary to appropriate the returns to the firm?s own R&D, but patents also create potential claims against the rents of rival firms. Analysis of the model reveals a general necessary condition for the existence of a positive correlation between the firm?s R&D intensity and the number of patents it obtains. When that condition is violated, changes in exogenous parameters that induce an increase in firms? patenting can also induce a decline in R&D intensity. Such a negative relationship is more likely when (1) there is sufficient overlap in firms? technologies so that each firm?s inventions are likely to infringe the patents of another firm, (2) firms are sufficiently R&D intensive, and (3) patents are cheap relative to both the cost of R&D and the value of final output. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Despite much work, economists have not been able to quantitatively account for the differences in the Japanese and U.S. saving rates after World War II. In this paper, we show that the use of actual Japanese total factor productivity growth rates in a standard growth model generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the Japanese data between 1956 and 2000.