Knowledge that Transforms

We split up the standard momentum return over months t−12 to t−2 at the highest stock price within this formation period. Of the overall momentum profits in month t, 84% can be attributed to the return prior to this peak price although research has exclusively focused on the post-peak return so far. The return predictability of the forgotten component is consistent with investor underreaction as underlying mechanism. Contrary to standard momentum strategies, the corresponding long-short returns are positively skewed, avoid momentum crashes, show no market state dependence, and yield consistent return premiums in both the US and international stock markets.

We study a global panel of green and conventional corporate bonds to assess the borrowing cost advantage at issuance for green bond issuers. We find that, on average, green corporate bonds have a yield spread that is between 3 and 8 basis points lower relative to conventional bonds, depending on the regression specification. We link this borrowing cost advantage, or “greenium,” to demand pressure at issuance, highlighting a key mechanism through which the greenium is allocated. We find that a significant greenium emerges only as of 2019, coinciding with the growth of the sustainable asset management industry following EU regulation. While green bond governance and external review appear to matter for the greenium, the credibility of the underlying projects has little impact. Instead, the greenium is unevenly distributed to large, investment-grade issuers, primarily within the banking sector and developed economies. These findings have implications for the role of green bonds in incentivizing meaningful green investments throughout the global economy.

We find that valuations of Venture Capital-backed startup companies invested by mutual funds are driven by their peer valuations rather than their fundamentals, such as operating performances. As startups oftentimes experience substantial valuation changes at their Initial Public Offerings (IPO), we also investigate the share pricing transition of startups from private to public companies. We find that more active pricing of shares prior to the IPO correlates with smaller discrepancies between private and public valuations as well as lower IPO mispricing, suggesting a link between private and public market pricing efficiency. Jointly, our results help investors and regulators achieve a better understanding of the dynamics behind misvaluation in private assets in general, and startups in particular.

Beyond a bias toward local stocks, investors prefer companies in certain cities over others. This study uses the geographic network of investor-followed stocks from stock watchlists to identify intercity investment preferences in China. We measure the city-pair connectivity by its likelihood of sharing an investor in common whose stock watchlist is highly concentrated in the firms of that city pair. We find that a higher connectivity-weighted aggregate stock demand-to-supply ratio across connected cities is associated with higher stock valuations, higher turnover, better liquidity, and lower cost of equity for firms in the focal city. The effects are robust to controls for geographic proximity and the broad investor base, are stronger among small firms, extend to stock return predictability, and imply excess intercity return comovement. Our results suggest that city connectivity revealed on the stock watchlist helps identify network factors in asset pricing.

During the 2015 stock market crisis, the Chinese government used hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase shares directly in the secondary market. We find that compared with non-rescued firms, rescued firms have significantly lower liquidity after being rescued. Policy uncertainty regarding subsequent interventions better explains the reduction in liquidity than the liquidity dry-up and bad firm signaling hypotheses. Inconsistent with the potential moral hazards associated with government bailouts, the investment policies of rescued firms become more conservative after being rescued. Our evidence warns of the unintended consequences of direct purchase rescue programs.

We investigate housing market distortions with the collusion of agents. The agency problem where agents sell clients' houses with price discounts while selling their own homes with price premiums is quite straightforward. However, the issue that agents collude with each other to further maximize their own interests is elusive. When agents collude, the resulting market distortions may even be worse than previous studies suggested. Indeed, this paper finds that the agency problem and market distortions are much more severe with agent collusion, as both the discounts associated with clients' houses and the premiums with agents' own homes become much larger when the two agents collude.

We provide international empirical evidence that periods of rapid expansion in credit—credit booms—lead to both a relaxation of financial constraints and a worsening of capital allocation. These two effects are related, suggesting a more prominent role for the investor sentiment views of the credit cycle. Firms more likely to be financially constrained because of their size, industry, or country experience stronger misallocation in booms. At the macro level, credit booms with higher capital misallocation result in a higher probability of experiencing a banking crisis and poor economic and financial performance after the boom ends.

This study develops a theoretical model to analyze the asset substitution problem over insurance decisions. We find that agency conflict is related to a firm’s risk level and capital structure. In particular, at the optimal leverage, agency conflict occurs only when the risk level is relatively high, which explains why insurance covenants are typically for significant pure risks. Moreover, when the risk level is specified, agency conflict over insurance decisions occurs within a specific leverage range. This is consistent with the findings of some research on the asset substitution problem over speculative risk choices. In addition, we consider premium loadings and conclude that full hedging is not a firm’s optimal risk management strategy, contributing to the literature on optimal hedging decisions with transaction frictions. Our framework with premium loadings can also explain many insurance phenomena, such as risk retention for small losses and subsidies for catastrophe insurance.

Fabo et al. (2021) show that papers written by central bank researchers find quantitative easing (QE) to be more effective than papers written by academics. Weale and Wieladek (2022) show that a subset of these results lose statistical significance when OLS regressions are replaced by regressions that downweight outliers. We examine those outliers and find no reason to downweight them. Most of them represent estimates from influential central bank papers published in respectable academic journals. For example, among the five papers finding the largest peak effect of QE on output, all five are published in high-quality journals (Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and Applied Economics Letters), and their average number of citations is well over 200. Moreover, we show that these papers have supported policy communication by the world's leading central banks and shaped the public perception of the effectiveness of QE. New evidence based on quantile regressions further supports the results in Fabo et al. (2021).

There is mixed empirical evidence on whether close banking relationships are associated with lower or higher earnings quality of borrowing firms. This paper analyzes how this evidence can be explained by the role of the bank, whether the bank is a creditor or equity-holder of the firm. We use a sample of Japanese public firms. In Japan, (1) banks historically have both close financial and personal ties to borrowing firms, (2) banks are not only lenders, but are also permitted to have an equity stake in the firm, and (3) detailed data on bank relationship characteristics are publicly available. One key result is that relationship banking is associated with lower earnings quality if the bank only provides debt. This effect is more pronounced in years of economic expansion. The results are in line with the theoretical literature, which argues that borrowing firms that want to conceal good performance from competitors benefit from relationship banking because banks’ access to private information lowers the demand for high earnings quality. However, if banks have an equity stake, they are more concerned about complying with insider-trading rules and governing agency problems of equity by efficient executive compensation contracts. Consistently, the second main finding is that the firm's earnings quality improves significantly with a bank's equity stake, regardless of the state of the economy. These results are robust according to various specifications of relationship banking or earnings quality.