Knowledge that Transforms

A systems cointegration rank test is proposed that is applicable for vector autoregressive (VAR) processes with a structural shift at unknown time. The structural shift is modeled as a simple shift in the level of the process. It is proposed to estimate the break date first on the basis of a full unrestricted VAR model. Two alternative estimators are considered and their asymptotic properties are derived. In the next step the deterministic part of the process including the shift size is estimated and the series are adjusted by subtracting the estimated deterministic part. A Johansen type test for the cointegrating rank is applied to the adjusted series. The test statistic is shown to have a well-known asymptotic null distribution that does not depend on the break date. The performance of the procedure in small samples is investigated by simulations.

We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

The local Whittle (or Gaussian semiparametric) estimator of long range dependence, proposed by Künsch (1987) and analyzed by Robinson (1995a), has a relatively slow rate of convergence and a finite sample bias that can be large. In this paper, we generalize the local Whittle estimator to circumvent these problems. Instead of approximating the short-run component of the spectrum, ϕ(λ) , by a constant in a shrinking neighborhood of frequency zero, we approximate its logarithm by a polynomial. This leads to a "local polynomial Whittle" (LPW) estimator. We specify a data-dependent adaptive procedure that adjusts the degree of the polynomial to the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero and selects the bandwidth. The resulting "adaptive LPW" estimator is shown to achieve the optimal rate of convergence, which depends on the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero, up to a logarithmic factor. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions which can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p > 1/2. Condorcet's Jury Theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.

The purpose of this note is to show how semiparametric estimators with a small bias property can be constructed. The small bias property (SBP) of a semiparametric estimator is that its bias converges to zero faster than the pointwise and integrated bias of the nonparametric estimator on which it is based. We show that semiparametric estimators based on twicing kernels have the SBP. We also show that semiparametric estimators where nonparametric kernel estimation does not affect the asymptotic variance have the SBP. In addition we discuss an interpretation of series and sieve estimators as idempotent transformations of the empirical distribution that helps explain the known result that they lead to the SBP. In Monte Carlo experiments we find that estimators with the SBP have mean-square error that is smaller and less sensitive to bandwidth than those that do not have the SBP.

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

In an environment where trading volume affects security prices and where prices are uncertain when trades are submitted, quasi-arbitrage is the availability of a series of trades that generate infinite expected profits with an infinite Sharpe ratio. We show that when the price impact of trades is permanent and time-independent, only linear price-impact functions rule out quasi-arbitrage and thus support viable market prices. When trades have also a temporary price impact, only the permanent price impact must be linear while the temporary one can be of a more general form. We also extend the analysis to a time-dependent framework.

This paper extends the conditional logit approach (Rasch, Andersen, Chamberlain) used in panel data models of binary variables with correlated fixed effects and strictly exogenous regressors. In a two-period two-state model, necessary and sufficient conditions on the joint distribution function of the individual-and-period specific shocks are given such that the sum of individual binary variables across time is a sufficient statistic for the individual effect. By extending a result of Chamberlain, it is shown that root-n consistent regular estimators can be constructed in panel binary models if and only if the property of sufficiency holds. In applied work, the estimation method amounts to quasi-differencing the binary variables as if they were continuous variables and transforming a panel data model into a cross-section model. Semiparametric approaches can then be readily applied.

This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.