Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City by Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande and Sujata Visaria. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 505-10 of American Economic Review, May 2008
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate how households' portfolio allocations change in response to wealth fluctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast, our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not affected by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of household portfolio allocation seems to be inertia: households rebalance only very slowly following inflows and outflows or capital gains and losses.
Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle by Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan and Marian V. Wrobel. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 304-09 of American Economic Review, May 2008
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has created a new economic area, larger and closer with respect to the rest of the world. Area-specifi cs hocks are thus more important in EMU than country-specific shocks used to be in the previous states, e.g. in Germany. It is thus not surprising that the models used to determine optimal monetary policy in the Euro area (for instance Smets and Wouters, 2004, ) assume that this works essentially as a closed economy, hit by domestic shocks– i.e. the same assumption made in standard models of U.S. monetary policy (see e.g. Christiano et al., 1999 ), where all shocks are domestic with the only possible exception of energy price shocks. This paper studies monetary policy in the Euro area looking at the variable most directly related to current and expected monetary policy, the yield on long term government bonds. We explore how the behaviour of European long-term rates has been affected by EMU and whether the response of long-term rates to monetary policy has got any closer to that consistent with a closed economy. We find that the level of long-term rates in Europe is almost entirely explained by U.S. shocks and by the systematic response of U.S. and European variables to these shocks. The systematic component of European monetary policy responds to U.S. variables more than it does to local variables. This was true for the Bundesbank before EMU and remains true for the ECB since the start of EMU. We also find that unpredictable fluctuations in long-term rates are driven by shocks to term premia,.not to monetary policy. This means that the ECB can affect long rates only through the systematic component of its monetary policy–which, as we have seen, mostly responds to U.S. variables. Monetary policy ”shocks” induced by the ECB have virtually no effect on long rates. Claiming that monetary policy in the Euro area can be determined as if the region were a closed economy is thus not consistent with the empirical evidence on
Does the Secondary Life Insurance Market Threaten Dynamic Insurance? by Glenn Daily, Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 151-56 of American Economic Review, May 2008
The utility of homeownership as a household wealth-building vehicle has long been recognized. In recent years, homeownership has been promoted as an important strategy for improving the financial situation of lowand moderateincome households. However, this strategy does not come without its risks, as homeownership exposes households to potential troubles along multiple dimensions. This paper highlights the conditions under which a homeownership strategy is likely to be effective. A key contribution is its significant focus on the risks of homeownership, which are assessed by studying the distribution of foreclosure across neighborhoods. According to the Current Population Survey (CPS), between 1994 and 2006, homeownership rates among households in the first and second income quartiles increased by 11.1 and 12.9 percent, respectively. This exceeded the 10.3 percent increase observed for the general population and was due in part to several factors. First, income, education, and wealth for lowand moderate-income households all increased significantly over this period (Arthur B. Kennickell 2006), which increased the accesAssets And Credit Among Low-inCome HouseHoLds †
For over three centuries and across the globe, lottery-linked savings (LLS) programs have offered individuals the opportunity to save, and in lieu of paying traditional interest, have given savers periodic chances to win money or prizes. Despite their long history, LLS programs are relatively unstudied by scholars. In this paper, I detail an LLS program that the UK government has offered continuously since 1956, the UK Premium Bond (PB) program. PBs guarantee holders risk-free return of nominal principal. In aggregate, they pay a market-related return, distributed to holders each month by a lottery like mechanism. Premium bonds are popular savings vehicles in the UK. Over £31.1 billion of PBs were outstanding as of March 2006, and public reports suggest that they were held by between 22 percent and 40 percent of UK citizens. The 60.2 million residents of the UK had £517 invested in PBs per capita. If held in the banking sector, PB holdings would have accounted for 3.9 percent of household sterling deposits in UK financial institutions. LLS programs, such as PBs, are fascinating not just because of their size, but because of their appeal to nonsavers, especially low-income families. Mauro Guillen and Adrian Tschoegl (2002, reviewing LLS programs in Latin America, concluded: “The bankers we spoke with believe that [LLS] are especially successful with low income depositors, and in cases where there are lots of people outside the banking system.” In South Africa, a new LLS program raised over 1.2 billion rand and enrolled 750,000 participants across a wide spectrum of the economy in two years. In the United Kingdom, while PBs are held by about the same fraction of the population holding stocks, PBs have a stronger appeal to lower-income British households. PBs are held by a larger fraction of British households than are stocks and shares for all households, except those earning over £52,000 annually (Department for Work and Pensions 2007). Are PB holders saving, gambling, or engaging in both activities? This question is not just academic, because national laws and regulations in many countries bar private LLS programs on the basis that they are prohibited gambling activities. For example, in South Africa, the government has tried to shut down the popular LLS program mentioned above; in the United States, these programs would violate state lottery laws and federal banking regulations. In this paper, I analyze the time series of net sales of the PB program and conclude that the program appears to be a hybrid of gambling and savings, but with a clear savings element.
Committees always seem to have chairmen, and monetary policy committees (MPCs) are no exception. But some MPCs are dominated by their chairmen, who are definitely first among unequals, while others come closer to making decisions by true consensus or even by major? ity vote. Does it matter? Is strong leadership an important ingredient in good monetary policy? With no real-world observations on leaderless
An earlier study (Barro 2006) applied the Thomas A. Rietz (1988) insight on rare eco? nomic disasters to explain the equity premium and related asset-pricing puzzles. Key param? eters were the probability, p, of disaster and the distribution of disaster sizes, b. In the main analysis, p and the ?-distribution were assumed to be time invariant. An extension to time-vary? ing p is in Xavier Gabaix (2008). Because large macroeconomic disasters are rare, pinning down p and the ?-distribution from historical data requires long time series for many countries, along with the assumption of rough parameter stability over time and across countries. Barro (2006) relied on the long-term international GDP data for 35 countries from Angus Maddison (2003). Using the definition of an economic disaster as a peak-to-trough fall in per capita GDP by at least 15 percent, 60 disas? ters were found, corresponding to p ?* 0.017 per year. The average disaster size was 29 percent, and the empirical size distribution was used to calibrate a model of asset pricing. The underlying asset-pricing theory relates to consumption, C, rather than GDP. This distinc? tion is especially important for wars. For exam? ple, in the United Kingdom during the two world wars, GDP increased while C fell sharply?the difference representing mostly added military spending. Maddison (2003) provides national-accounts information only for GDP. Our initial idea was to add consumption, C, which we measure by personal consumer expenditure because of diffi? culties in separating durables from nondurables in the long-term data. We have not assembled data on government consumption, some of which may substitute for C and, thereby, affect asset pricing. However, this substitution is prob? ably unimportant for military outlays, which are the type of government spending that moves a lot during some disaster events. Maddison (2003) represents a monumental contribution for international studies using long term GDP data. However, although much of the information is sound, close examination revealed many problems. Specifically, Maddison tends to fill in missing data with doubtful assumptions, and this practice is often significant for major crises. As examples, Maddison assumed that Belgium's GDP during WWI and WWII moved with France's; that Mexico's GDP between 1910 and 1920, including the Revolution and Civil War, followed a smooth trend (with no crisis); that GDP for Colombia and Peru over more than a decade moved with the average of Brazil and Chile; and that GDP in Germany for the crucial years 1944-1946 followed a linear trend. There are also some mismatches between original works and published series for GDP in Japan at the end of WWII and Greece during WWII and its Civil War. Given these difficulties, our project expanded to estimating long-term GDP for many countries. The Maddison informa? tion was often usable, but superior estimates can be constructed in many cases. Also, results from recent major long-term national-accounts projects for some countries are now available, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Taiwan. We are dealing with long-term national accounts data for 41 countries, but the current study applies to the 21 for which we have, thus far, assembled annual data on C and GDP from before WWI to 2006. (See Table 1 for a list of included countries and starting years.) We begin + Discussant: John Campbell, Harvard University.
The intertemporal elasticity of investment for long-lived capital goods is nearly infinite. Consequently, investment prices should fully reflect temporary tax subsidies, regardless of the investment supply elasticity. Since prices move one-for-one with the subsidy, elasticities can be inferred from quantities alone. This paper uses a recent tax policy—bonus depreciation—to estimate the investment supply elasticity. Investment in qualified capital increased sharply. The estimated elasticity is high—between 6 and 14. There is no evidence that market prices reacted to the subsidy, suggesting that adjustment costs are internal, or that measurement error masks the price changes.