Knowledge that Transforms

Internal control system, Decision making, Parallel-processing control decisions

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm, Wilfred C. Uecker, A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, Studies on Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Current Research Issues (1985), pp. 81-120

Voluntary Disclosure, Management forecasts, Earnings volatility, Timing

Responsibility accounting, Performance evaluation, Principle-agent model, Compensation

Internal auditors, Objectivity

Inventory accounting method, Political costs, Agency costs, Production and investment characteristics

[The existence of perfect equilibrium is demonstrated for a class of games with compact space of histories and continuous payoffs, and in which the set of actions feasible at any given period is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence of the previous history of the game. The proof is by construction. A set of histories is constructed, each of which is the equilibrium path of some perfect equilibrium point of the game. Also, any equilibrium path is a member of this set. The construction therefore provides a characterization of perfect equilibrium.]

Let F be a private ownership economy. Call an allocation w for a price vector p if no agent can benefit by trading less at p. We prove that, under differentiability and interiority, if w is voluntary and Pareto efficient it is a competitive equilibrium for W. Perhaps surprisingly, production economies where some agents receive profit income require a stronger voluntariness condition than the one sufficient for exchange economies. The stronger condition singles out a commodity as a medium of exchange.

Etude de jeux cooperatifs qui sont des jeux a plusieurs joueurs mis sous la forme de coalition dans lesquels l'utilite n'est pas supposee etre transferable