Why Do Firms in Developing Countries Have Low Productivity? by Nicholas Bloom, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie and John Roberts. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 619-23 of American Economic Review, May 2010
To gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. Such "direct price discrimination" is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings. Using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998–2005, I find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. Moreover, within a given firm, those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases. The findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.
This study examines why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these influences. Using an experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in time, we present several results. For example, previous donors are more likely to give, and contribute more, than other donor types. Yet, how previous donors were acquired is critical: agents initially attracted by an economic mechanism are more likely to continue giving than agents attracted by a nonmechanism factor. From a methodological viewpoint, our study showcases the benefit of moving beyond an experimental design that focuses on short-run substitution effects.
The welfare effects of trade shocks turn on the nature and magnitude of the costs workers face in moving between sectors. Using an Euler-type equilibrium condition derived from a rational expectations model of dynamic labor adjustment, we estimate the mean and variance of workers' switching costs from the US CPS. We estimate high values of both parameters, implying slow adjustment of the economy and sharp movements in wages in response to trade shocks. However, import-competing workers can still benefit from tariff removal; liberalization lowers their wages in the short and long run but raises their option value.
In a series of binary choice problems, we investigate how a chooser's risk taking changes when others share in their personal risk, either equally or unequally. We find that when the safe option yields inequality, the risky option is taken significantly more often. On the other hand, the inequality resulting from the risky choice does not affect risk taking. We also find that choosers tend to be less risk-averse in a one-person context compared to when the risk also affects the payoff of another. (C72, D81, Z13)
The United States is beginning to emerge from the deepest downturn the country has experienced since the Great Depression. As of October 2009, the number of unemployed persons had risen by 8.2 million since the “Great Recession” began in December 2007. All demographic groups have experienced job losses, but some groups have been more adversely affected than others. Repeating the pattern of most previous downturns, the recession’s impact has been worst for low education and minority workers. One group that has been particularly hard hit is Mexican immigrants. Data from the Current Population Survey indicate that between the first quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009, the unemployment rate among Mexican immigrants rose from 4.2 percent to 11.3 percent, and their employment rate dropped by 5 percentage points. In contrast, during that period the unemployment rate among non-Hispanic white natives rose from 3.7 percent to 7.8 percent, and their employment rate fell by 2.6 percentage points. Mexican immigrants tend to be particularly vulnerable to economic downturns because of their relatively low skill levels. They make up one-fourth of all workers who do not have a high school diploma or equivalent and over one-half of workers who have completed at most eighth grade. When the economy slows, employers look to shed their least productive employees first. Employers tend to invest less in training low skilled workers and therefore have less
Several impatient investors with private costs C i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-C i . We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost.
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions.
Can marriage institutions limit marital inefficiency? We study the pervasive custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. Watta satta can be seen as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of two sets of parents, each wishing to restrain their son-in-law. We find that marital discord, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is indeed significantly lower in watta satta versus “conventional” marriage, but only after accounting for selection bias. These benefits cannot be explained by endogamy, a marriage pattern associated with watta satta.
This paper describes the extent of product creation and destruction in a large sector of the US economy. We find four times more entry and exit in product markets than is found in labor markets because most product turnover happens within firms. Net product creation is strongly procyclical and primarily driven by creation rather than destruction. We find that a cost-of-living index that takes product turnover into account is 0.8 percentage points per year lower than a “fixed goods” price index like the CPI. The procyclicality of the bias implies that business cycles are more volatile than indicated by official statistics.