Knowledge that Transforms

The provision of examples as implementation guidance is pervasive in accounting standards. Prior research has established that preparers engage in “example‐based reasoning,” a tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example, even when the example does not exactly match the transaction at hand. In this paper, we investigate whether fact‐weighting guidance counteracts this tendency. Such guidance, now found in some accounting standards, indicates whether particular transaction facts are more important than others in determining the appropriate accounting treatment. Using an experiment, we find that fact‐weighting guidance does reduce preparers' tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example. However, results also suggest that some degree of example‐based reasoning persists even with fact‐weighting guidance, and that preparers are not fully aware of how fact‐weighting guidance affects their judgments. Our findings have practical implications. They suggest to standard setters a potential remedy—namely, fact‐weighting guidance—for the misuse of accounting examples. They also provide insights to accounting preparers regarding how fact‐weighting guidance influences their judgments in ways they may not anticipate.

We test whether credit rating analysts consider managerial ability as a credit risk factor and find that higher‐ability managers obtain more favorable credit ratings. Controlling for past performance, these results suggest that managerial ability is itself a significant credit rating factor. Cross‐sectional analyses indicate that managerial ability is beneficial specifically in firms facing financial or competitive pressure. We find that high‐ability managers mitigate the adverse impact on ratings of other credit risk factors including negative earnings and low interest coverage. Our results contribute to a growing literature documenting economic benefits to hiring and retaining high‐quality management.

I use a laboratory experiment to examine the productive and counterproductive effects of providing employees nonpecuniary recognition based on measures of relative performance. I find that, on average, recognition programs increase both productive efforts (those intended to increase one's own performance) and counterproductive efforts (those intended to decrease peer performance) in a setting where it is salient to employees that they can exert both productive and counterproductive efforts. Interestingly, I also find that these effects are moderated by the Dark Triad of personalities, a group of three personality traits. My study reveals that recognition programs mainly lead individuals who score lower on the Dark Triad to increase counterproductive efforts and those who score higher on the Dark Triad to increase productive efforts. These results contribute to the literature on relative performance information by demonstrating that recognition programs can have both productive and counterproductive effects. However, whether these programs produce mainly a productive or counterproductive effect depends on important personality characteristics of the employees.

We explore the optimal timing of voluntary disclosures when firms and outside investors have correlated but not identical signals. By delaying disclosure of their signal, firms encourage the acquisition of information by investors by reducing the latter's exposure to the long‐term risk of holding the asset. Immediate disclosure reduces rents from acquiring the correlated signal, and thus is sometimes suboptimal in a dynamic setting. We characterize conditions under which postponing disclosure is preferable, which allows us to develop predictions on the timing of voluntary information disclosures such as management guidance.

Prior studies find that audit fees are higher for cross‐listed firms, and these studies primarily attribute the incremental fees to added litigation costs. In this study, we investigate whether the higher audit fees that foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay are also attributable to incremental audit effort associated with U.S. disclosure requirements and a more stringent U.S. auditing environment. By comparing audit fees of foreign cross‐listed firms to U.S. domiciled firms and to non‐cross‐listed foreign firms, we are able to decompose incremental audit fees into portions attributable to added audit effort and to added litigation costs. We find that, on average, foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay significantly higher fees than domestic U.S. firms and foreign firms that do not cross‐list. Furthermore, we find that audit effort is almost as important as litigation costs in explaining the higher fees associated with foreign cross‐listed firms; our estimates suggest that between 29 percent and 48 percent of the incremental fees are attributable to incremental audit effort. In addition, the total cross‐listing premium is increasing in the difference between the U.S. auditing regulatory environment and that of the home country of the cross‐listed firm. Our study improves our understanding of the role of audit effort in explaining the added fees charged by auditors when foreign firms cross‐list in the United States.

We examine whether, in the aggregate, margin debt is associated with the divergence of price from accounting fundamentals. We find that investors increase their margin debt following upward price movements away from accounting fundamentals, consistent with these investors being extrapolative in aggregate. We also find evidence that margin debt appears to be linked to temporary overpricing in recent periods, as the aggregate ratio of margin debt to price is reliably associated with negative future returns since at least 1992. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature that predicts extrapolative traders have a destabilizing effect on market prices, and helps explain why prices diverge from accounting fundamentals.

The accounting literature includes numerous examples of discontinuities at prominent benchmarks that are widely interpreted as evidence that earnings are managed to meet those benchmarks. However, there are a few examples where discontinuities do not exist, which are sometimes interpreted as inconsistent with earnings management. Alternative explanations for discontinuities have also been suggested. This paper reviews, evaluates, and integrates the available evidence and concludes that the theory that earnings are managed to meet benchmarks provides the simplest and most complete explanation for the body of discontinuity‐related evidence.

Using 1990 through 2013 data of U.S. firms with foreign operations, we show that (i) the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, (ii) post‐earnings‐announcement drift ( PEAD ) based on analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, and (iii) the impact of international diversification on the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors and its associated drift is significantly reduced after the implementation of SFAS 131 on segment disclosures. When we replicate our tests using seasonally differenced earnings, we fail to observe similar patterns. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ underreaction to announced earnings is a likely explanation for PEAD . Our findings also indicate that disclosures required under SFAS 131 are useful to analysts in forming efficient earnings expectations, thereby helping capital market participants in the pricing of internationally diversified firms’ earnings.

This paper derives the impacts of legal system characteristics and auditing standards on auditor behavior (audit quality), and analyzes the determination of optimal auditing standards under different legal regimes. Legal regimes are characterized by differences in the uncertainty concerning the outcome of legal proceedings (termed vagueness of legal systems) and differences in the average size of damage awards. Auditing standards as determined by standard setters can vary in both toughness and vagueness. Our analysis provides implications for the adoption of International Standards on Auditing ( ISA ). Countries, such as the United States, where auditor legal liability is significantly more onerous than the global norm are not likely to adopt ISA , since these standards may not induce auditors to provide the optimal level of audit quality. Conversely, the adoption of ISA by countries, such as China, where the legal system makes the recovery of damages from auditors quite difficult, is not by itself likely to result in a high level of audit quality. Furthermore, our model suggests that auditor rotation can help improve audit quality, but only in certain circumstances.

Trust is often posited to substitute for management control in interfirm transactions. However, this raises questions of how trust arises in new relationships, and whether trust that is not based on prior experience transacting together is sufficient to persuade managers to forgo investments in management controls. We use an experiment to test whether two features of the early stage of an interfirm relationship influence a buyer's initial trust in a supplier and have consequences for subsequent investments in management controls and in the collaboration. These two features are the autonomy of the buyer's manager to choose a supplier (i.e., delegation of decision‐making authority) and the supplier's willingness to share information with the buyer. We find that the buyer manager's initial trust in the supplier is associated positively with both the autonomy to choose the supplier and the supplier's willingness to share information. Information content and supplier characteristics are held constant, so these results are novel and distinct from prior studies of the antecedents of trust. We find that higher initial trust is associated with reduced expenditures for management controls and increased investments in the collaboration. Thus, we conclude that delegation of decision‐making authority and supplier information‐sharing behavior in the early stages of a relationship influence the formation of initial trust, which has real consequences for investments in management control and in the collaboration.