Knowledge that Transforms

To test hypotheses about earnings management, many studies investigate managers' manipulation of real activities (real earnings management, REM). Tests using measures of abnormal REM hinge critically on the measurement of normal real activities. Yet, there is no systematic evidence on the statistical properties of commonly used REM measures. We provide such evidence by documenting the Type I error rates and power of the test of the REM measures commonly used in the literature. We find these measures are often misspecified with Type I error rates that deviate from the nominal significance level of the test, especially in samples of firms with extreme performance or firm characteristics. We also compare the specification and power of traditional REM measures with performance‐matched REM measures to see if the latter provide better specified and more powerful tests. While performance‐matched REM measures are not immune from misspecification in all settings, in general they are better specified under the null hypothesis (i.e., in terms of Type I errors) than are traditional REM measures. Comparisons of the power to detect abnormal REM reveal that neither approach, traditional or performance‐matched, is consistently more powerful than the other in terms of detecting abnormal REM ranging from 1 to 10 percent of (lagged) total assets. The absence of a dominant approach to measure abnormal REM leads us to recommend that future researchers report results using both traditional and performance‐matched measures, so that readers are able to clearly assess the reliability of the inferences drawn about the magnitude and significance of the abnormal REM documented in a given study.

We examine the use of intuition versus analytical thinking in auditor risk assessment using a task that requires auditors to assess a group of impairment indicators. We expect that auditor intuition, rooted in the subconscious, more likely reacts to impairment indicator risk than does auditor analytical thinking. Results from two different experiments support this expectation for less‐experienced audit seniors. These seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think intuitively versus analytically . In contrast, a third experiment finds that experienced seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think analytically versus intuitively . This is consistent with the more experienced but still non‐expert seniors possessing developed analytical thinking, but struggling to effectively use their intuition. Our results inform theory by suggesting under what conditions auditor intuition and analytical thinking produce differential risk sensitivity. Furthermore, our results inform practice, given regulators' stated focus on auditor skepticism and impairment assessments.

We combine a fundamental property of accruals and a behavioral phenomenon to provide an explanation for the accrual anomaly. The fundamental property is accruals that originate must subsequently reverse. The behavioral phenomenon is individuals tend to underestimate the variance of noisy signals in various domains of decision making. We argue that originating accruals represents a noisier signal than reversing accruals because the uncertainty of whether originating accruals will eventually convert into cash is high, while there is no uncertainty regarding reversing accruals. If investors underestimate the variance of originating accruals but understand reversing accruals, then originating accruals will be mispriced while reversing accruals will not. To test this prediction, we first develop and empirically validate a novel method for ex ante detecting accrual originations and their reversals. Then we document that investors face increased uncertainty when accruals originate and decreased uncertainty when accruals reverse, and we provide evidence that only originating accruals are mispriced. We further demonstrate that our findings can be useful for improving the accrual‐based trading strategy by ex ante detecting and removing accrual reversals from extreme accrual portfolios. Overall, we provide a behavioral explanation for the accrual anomaly that is consistent with the mispricing of originating accruals only.

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (i) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and (ii) the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired when the outcome of earnings management suggests that managers have put their interests above shareholders' interests and/or when the method of earnings management suggests that managers misreported the firm's economic performance. We argue that shareholders assess managers putting their interests above shareholders' interests as a signal of untrustworthiness because it involves a transfer of the firm's resources away from shareholders to managers. We argue that shareholders also assess managers' use of accruals to manage earnings as a signal of untrustworthiness because, in this instance, managers misreport the firm's economic performance. Finally, we show that trust mediates the combined effects of the outcome of earnings management and the method of earnings management on investment decisions. Our study incrementally contributes to the literature by highlighting the adverse implications of managers' use of accruals to manage earnings even when its outcome serves shareholders' interests.

We exploit two regulatory shocks to examine the informational effects of tightening preexisting mandatory disclosure rules. Canadian National Instrument 51‐101 in 2003 and the U.S. rule “Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting” in 2009 introduced quasi‐identical amendments which effectively tightened the rules governing oil and gas reserve disclosures in both countries. We document significant changes in firms' reporting outcomes when the new regulations are introduced. We also find that the reserve disclosures filed under the new regulations are more closely associated with stock price changes and with decreases in bid‐ask spreads. Our findings are robust to controlling for other confounding factors such as time trends, other information disclosed simultaneously, financial reporting incentives, mispricing, and monitoring efforts.

This study examines whether the volatility of interim estimates of the annual effective tax rate (ETR) provides ex ante information about the quality of firms' internal control environments. Recent research suggests that some firms selectively disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs). Given the negative consequences associated with ICWs, it is important for capital market participants to be able to identify firms with ineffective internal controls in a timely manner. We find that firms with more volatile annual ETR estimates are more likely to report both tax‐ and nontax‐related ICWs in the current year. Our results also indicate that the volatility of annual ETR estimates declines following the remediation of tax‐related ICWs, but not following the remediation of nontax‐related ICWs. In addition, we find that ETR volatility in the current year is associated with the likelihood that a firm will report an ICW in the following year. Finally, we provide evidence that the volatility of annual ETR estimates is associated with the likelihood that a firm has an undisclosed ICW. In combination, our results suggest that the volatility of interim estimates of the annual ETR provides an ex ante signal of the likelihood that a firm's internal controls are ineffective.

Employer‐sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece‐rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non‐winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware‐incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost‐effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.

We examine the stock market consequences of disclosing accounting irregularities for U.S.‐listed foreign firms. After controlling for the severity of the irregularity and other firm characteristics, we find that foreign firms experience significantly more negative short‐window stock market reactions following irregularity announcements than do U.S. firms. Moreover, for a subsample of 64 irregularities of foreign firms that are listed on both a U.S. and home country stock exchange, we find evidence that restating firms' U.S. investors react more negatively to the same irregularity than their home country investors. This differential market reaction appears related to firm‐specific information risks that are greater for foreign firms than U.S. firms. Collectively, consistent with the reputational bonding hypothesis in prior literature, our results suggest that accounting irregularities cause U.S. investors to reassess the information risk associated with foreign firms.

In a globalized audit environment, regulators and researchers have expressed concerns about inconsistent audit quality across nations, with a particular emphasis on Chinese audit quality. Prior research suggests Chinese audit quality may be lower than U.S. audit quality due to a weaker institutional environment (e.g., lower litigation and inspection risk) or cultural value differences (e.g., greater deference to authority). In this study, we propose that lower Chinese audit quality could also be due to Chinese auditors' different cognitive processing styles (i.e., cultural mindsets). We find U.S. auditors are more likely to engage in an analytic mindset approach, focusing on a subset of disconfirming information, whereas Chinese auditors are more likely to take a holistic mindset approach, focusing on a balanced set of confirming and disconfirming information. As a result, Chinese auditors make less skeptical judgments compared to U.S. auditors. We then propose an intervention in which we explicitly instruct auditors to consider using both a holistic and an analytic mindset approach when evaluating evidence. We find this intervention minimizes differences between Chinese and U.S. auditors' judgments by shifting Chinese auditors' attention more towards disconfirming evidence, improving their professional skepticism, while not causing U.S. auditors to become less skeptical. Our study contributes to the auditing literature by identifying cultural mindset differences as a causal mechanism underlying lower professional skepticism levels among Chinese auditors compared to U.S. auditors and providing standard setters and firms with a potential solution that can be adapted to improve Chinese auditors' professional skepticism and reduce cross‐national auditor judgment differences.