Knowledge that Transforms

This paper analyzes 19th and 20th century data from a well-known château in Bordeaux. The dataset includes information on weather conditions, starting dates of three phenological stages of grapevine, prices, and yields. We discuss how these variables have evolved over the last two centuries. We also study to what extent the impact of climate on yields and prices has changed over time. Our regression analysis suggests that the effect of temperature on yields has become weaker since the 19th century. The influence on prices has, on the contrary, become stronger.

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and pat terns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame. (JEL D82, D83, Z13)

In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small -- yet often relevant -- additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices.

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don't know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns. (JEL D21, D83, G12, G14, L11)

We examine the source of the large fall and rebound in US trade in the recent recession. While trade fell and rebounded more than expenditures or production of traded goods, we find that relative to the magnitude of the downturn, these trade fluctuations were in line with those in previous business cycle fluctuations. We argue that the high volatility of trade is attributed to more severe inventory management considerations of firms involved in international trade. We present empirical evidence for autos as well as at the aggregate level that the adjustment of inventory holdings help explain these fluctuations in trade.

Plott and Zeiler (2005) report that the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept disparity is absent for mugs in a particular experimental setting, designed to neutralize misconceptions about the procedures used to elicit valuations. This result has received sustained attention in the literature. However, other data from that same study, not published in that paper, exhibit a significant and persistent disparity when the same experimental procedures are applied to lotteries. We report new data confirming both results, thereby suggesting that the presence or absence of a disparity may be a more complex issue than some may have supposed. (JEL C91, D12, D81, D83)

A dispute about the size of the aggregate labor supply elasticity has been fortified by a contentious aggregation theory used by real business cycle theorists. The replacement of that aggregation theory with one more congenial to microeconomic observations opens possibilities for an accord about the aggregate labor supply elasticity. The new aggregation theory drops features to which empirical microeconomists objected and replaces them with life-cycle choices. Whether the new aggregation theory ultimately indicates a small or large macro labor supply elasticity will depend on how shocks and government institutions interact to put workers at interior solutions for career length.

In a market-clearing economy, declines in demand from one sector do not cause large declines in aggregate output because other sectors expand. The key price mediating the response is the interest rate. A decline in the rate stimulates all categories of spending. But in a low-inflation economy, the room for a decline in the rate is small, because of the notorious lower limit of zero on the nominal interest rate. In the Great Depression, substantial deflation caused the real interest rate to reach high levels. In the Great Slump that began at the end of 2007, low inflation resulted in an only slightly negative real rate when full employment called for a much lower real rate because of declines in demand. Fortunately, the inflation rate hardly responded to conditions in product and labor markets, else deflation might have occurred, with an even higher real interest rate. I concentrate on three closely related sources of declines in demand: the buildup of excess stocks of housing and consumer durables, the corresponding expansion of consumer debt that financed the buildup, and financial frictions that resulted from the decline in real-estate prices. (JEL E23, E24, E31, E32, E65)

We examine the impact of poor water quality on avoidance behavior by estimating the change in bottled water purchases in response to drinking water violations. Using data from a national grocery chain matched with water quality violations, we find an increase in bottled water sales of 22 percent from violations due to microorganisms and 17 percent from violations due to elements and chemicals. Back-of-the envelope calculations yield costs of avoidance behavior at roughly $60 million for all nationwide violations in 2005, which likely reflects a significant understatement of the total willingness to pay to eliminate violations.