Knowledge that Transforms

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “ neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)

Measuring the geographic spillovers from an economic shock remains a challenging econometric problem. In Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) we study the propagation of positive shocks from the recent boom in oil and gas production in the United States. We regress changes in income per capita on new energy production per capita within increasingly larger geographic circles. James and Smith (2020) proposes instead a single regression of county income per capita on energy production from successively larger donuts around the county. This method controls for production outside of the circle of interest and is likely the appropriate estimation method for estimating the impact of within-county production. Their results suggest that FMS overestimates the impact of new production. We show that we can incorporate similar controls using our basic estimation method and that (unlike James and Smith) these controls do not significantly change our results. To explore these differences, we perform simulation exercises which show that the James-Smith estimation method is biased downward with the heterogeneous population distributions across counties that we observe in the data. (JEL E24, E32, J31, Q35, Q43, R11, R23)

We investigate wealth returns on an administrative panel containing the disaggregated balance sheets of Swedish residents. The expected return on household net wealth is strongly persistent, determined primarily by systematic risk, and increasing in net worth, exceeding the risk-free rate by the size of the equity premium for households in the top 0.01 percent. Idiosyncratic risk is transitory but generates substantial long-term dispersion in returns in top brackets. Systematic and idiosyncratic risk both drive the cross-sectional distribution of the geometric average return over a generation. Furthermore, wealth returns explain most of the historical increase in top wealth shares. (JEL D31, G11, G51)

I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms’ payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe. (JEL C73, D43, D82, L12)

We establish that creditor beliefs regarding future borrowing can be self-fulfilling, leading to multiple equilibria with markedly different debt accumulation patterns. We characterize such indeterminacy in the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign debt model augmented with long maturity bonds. Two necessary conditions for the multiplicity are (i) the government is more impatient than foreign creditors, and (ii) there are deadweight losses from default. The multiplicity is dynamic and stems from the self-fulfilling beliefs of how future creditors will price bonds; long maturity bonds are therefore a crucial component of the multiplicity. We introduce a third party with deep pockets to discuss the policy implications of this source of multiplicity and identify the potentially perverse consequences of traditional “lender of last resort” policies. (JEL E44, E62, F34, H63, G12)

Matsumoto (2020) pointed out data and coding errors in Fang and Gong (2017). We show that these errors have limited impacts: all qualitative findings remain after correcting them. Matsumoto also discussed potential service overcounting in the aggregated utilization data we used to illustrate our method, and then quantified the extent of overcounting with a sample of Medicare claims. We acknowledge the issue but discuss the noise and the bias in his quantification. Overall, our proposed method remains useful, as regulators who are interested in applying the method are unlikely to be subject to the data limitations. (JEL H51, I13, I18, J22, J44)

Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) estimates the spatial dispersion of the effects of the recent shale-energy boom by unconditionally regressing income and employment on energy production at various levels of geographic aggregation. However, producing counties tend to be located near each other and receive inward spillovers from neighboring production. This inflates the estimated effect of own-county production and spatial aggregation does not address this. We propose an alternative estimation strategy that accounts for these spillovers and identify reduced propagation effects. The proposed estimation strategy can be applied more generally to estimate the dispersion of multiple, simultaneously occurring economic shocks. (JEL E24, E32, J31, Q35, Q43, R11, R23)

A seller bargains with a rationally inattentive buyer (Sims 2003) over a good of random quality. After observing quality, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The buyer pays attention to the seller’s product and offer at a cost proportional to expected entropy reduction. Because attention is free off-path, multiple equilibria emerge, many of which are efficient. A trembling-hand-like refinement (Selten 1975) rules out efficiency, delivering complete disagreement when attention is expensive and a unique equilibrium with trade when attention is cheap. In this equilibrium, the buyer overpays for low-quality goods, underpays for high-quality goods, and earns a strictly positive payoff. (JEL C78, D82, D83, D86, L15)

We exploit variation in mortgage modifications to disentangle the impact of reducing long-term obligations with no change in short-term payments (“wealth”), and reducing short-term payments with no change in long-term obligations (“liquidity”). Using regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences research designs with administrative data measuring default and consumption, we find that principal reductions that increase wealth without affecting liquidity have no effect, while maturity extensions that increase only liquidity have large effects. This suggests that liquidity drives default and consumption decisions for borrowers in our sample and that distressed debt restructurings can be redesigned with substantial gains to borrowers, lenders, and taxpayers. (JEL E21, G21, G51, R38)

We study the rationality of individual and consensus forecasts of macroeconomic and financial variables using the methodology of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), who examine predictability of forecast errors from forecast revisions. We find that individual forecasters typically overreact to news, while consensus forecasts under-react relative to full-information rational expectations. We reconcile these findings within a diagnostic expectations version of a dispersed information learning model. Structural estimation indicates that departures from Bayesian updating in the form of diagnostic overreaction capture important variation in forecast biases across different series, yielding a belief distortion parameter similar to estimates obtained in other settings. (JEL C53, D83, D84, E13, E17, E27, E47)