Knowledge that Transforms

We use machine learning methods and high‐dimensional detailed financial data to predict the direction of one‐year‐ahead earnings changes. Our models show significant out‐of‐sample predictive power: the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve ranges from 67.52% to 68.66%, significantly higher than the 50% of a random guess. The annual size‐adjusted returns to hedge portfolios formed based on the prediction of our models range from 5.02% to 9.74%. Our models outperform two conventional models that use logistic regressions and small sets of accounting variables, and professional analysts’ forecasts. Analyses suggest that the outperformance relative to the conventional models stems from both nonlinear predictor interactions missed by regressions and the use of more detailed financial data by machine learning.

We examine how tax cuts that benefit some firms are related to the economic performance of their direct competitors. Consistent with tax cuts decreasing the cost of initiating competitive strategies, we find that a decrease in the tax burden for only a specific group of firms in the U.S. economy (i.e., “rivals”) has a negative economic effect on the performance of its direct competitors not directly exposed to the same tax cut (i.e., “competitors”). This negative externality is stronger when the relatively higher taxed competitors (1) are financially constrained, (2) operate in more competitive markets, (3) have similar products to their lower taxed rivals, (4) face rivals that retain more of their cash tax savings due to lower dividends and share repurchases, and (5) face lower taxed, but financially constrained, rivals. We also find that shareholders and lenders price the negative externality manifested in these competitors’ economic performance.

We develop a measure of how information events impact investors' expectations of risk. The measure is broadly applicable and simple to implement. We derive it from an option‐pricing model, where investors anticipate an announcement that simultaneously conveys information on the announcer's expected future cash flows and risk profile. We empirically implement the measure using firms' earnings announcements, showing that it closely aligns with our model's predictions and offers strong forecasting power for firms' risk profiles, costs of capital, and future investments. We further highlight pitfalls of using simple changes in option‐implied volatilities to study information gleaned from earnings announcements. Finally, we apply our measure to study disclosure regulation, the efficacy of text‐based proxies, and market‐wide events, which we use to illustrate our measure's uses, and illuminate its potential limitations.

This paper investigates the effect of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms on their decision to go public. Using detailed project‐level data for biopharmaceutical firms, we explore the effects of a legal reform that exogenously required firms to publicly disclose information regarding clinical trials. Exploiting cross‐sectional heterogeneity in firms' exposure to the regulation based on their internal development portfolios, we find that affected firms are significantly more likely to transition to public equity markets following the reform. Moreover, firms that go public because of the increased disclosure requirements subsequently reduce the size of their project portfolios while shifting to safer investments acquired externally. We provide additional evidence for the main hypothesis using a second setting: a 2006 German reform which enhanced the enforcement of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms. The results suggest that private firms' general information environment and disclosure requirements influence the propensity of going public.

Could real‐time big data help unravel material firm events? How would it compare with firm disclosure and traditional media in terms of timeliness and completeness? Could big data provide incremental value‐relevant information for investors? With these questions in mind, we use a novel data set of cell phone “pings” (i.e., geolocation signals from mobile devices) to track production disruptions (outages)––material events for U.S. oil refineries. We first validate the construct by examining the effects of outages on local gas prices and firms’ accounting performance. Our main analyses show that (1) refining firms do not voluntarily disclose refinery outages identified by cell phone pings; (2) traditional media cover only a small portion of ping‐based outages; (3) the stock market finds ping‐based outages to be value relevant but incorporates the information with delay. Further analysis suggests that given the incomplete media coverage and lack of firm disclosure, investors appear to learn the financial impact of such outages through subsequent earnings announcements. Our evidence has implications for regulators such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission as they continue to evaluate both the compliance and usefulness of disclosures for material firm events such as production disruptions.

We investigate whether non‐GAAP reporting affects the audit process and thereby the quality of the related financial statements. First, we provide evidence that auditors in numerous countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, rely to varying degrees on non‐GAAP profit before tax as a benchmark for determining quantitative materiality. Then, using Premium Listed companies on the London Stock Exchange, we document that U.K. auditor reliance on non‐GAAP materiality benchmarks often results in a higher quantitative materiality amount and can lower audit quality. Although U.K. auditors appear skeptical of managers’ more aggressive non‐GAAP adjustments, auditors adopt more of management's low‐quality adjustments when auditor independence is weaker. In sum, our results suggest that non‐GAAP reporting can indirectly affect investors by reducing the rigor of the financial statement audit.

Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increases investors’ processing of repeated information, consistent with the informational role of repetition documented in prior research. In contrast, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, nonrepeated information when the filing is less interactive. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value‐relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of nonrepeated information. Further, more interactive disclosures lead to deeper overall processing of both repeated and nonrepeated information, rather than more interactive disclosures redirecting investors’ attention and processing away from repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of nonrepeated information, while preserving repetition's informational role.

In this study, we replicate and extend the Dichev and Skinner [DS: 2002] study on the debt covenant hypothesis (DCH). We start by replicating DS and find results consistent with theirs. We then extend their work by changing three aspects of the research design: histogram bin width, calculation of slack, and statistical test of discontinuity. We find that the inference from DS is generally robust to varying these choices, although sensitive to different bin widths, during their sample period. We extend our analysis to the period 2000–2019 and find that support for DCH remains robust. We do, however, find a lack of support for DCH when examining the most common financial covenant, debt‐to‐EBITDA. These findings suggest a more nuanced perspective on DCH, whereby different types of financial covenants provide different incentives and abilities to avoid technical default.

We examine whether a shock to the enforceability of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) limited its ability to restrict the flow of private information between managers and investors. Although prior work provides evidence that Reg FD reduced managers’ selective disclosure of material information immediately following its promulgation, we posit that private information flows returned as a result of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) public enforcement failure in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc . Using multiple settings, we find consistent evidence suggesting that Siebel changed the cost–benefit tradeoff for Reg FD compliance and effectively reversed the initial effects of the regulation. We also find that Siebel disrupted the equilibrium of selective disclosure activity, resulting in an unleveling effect among investors with respect to private information advantages. Finally, we find that Siebel also had real effects by altering managers’ capital structure decisions. Our findings run counter to the prevailing “mosaic theory” and gradual learning explanations for private information advantages in the extended post–Reg FD period and highlight the importance of enforcement in achieving intended regulatory outcomes.

We examine whether managers provide more voluntary disclosure when GAAP limits their reporting discretion in financial statements. We find managers are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, issue more management forecasts, and provide longer yet more readable management discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosures when GAAP limits their discretion. These effects are stronger when there is greater demand for information and better monitoring. In contrast, these effects are weaker when managers have incentives to manage earnings. Difference‐in‐differences analyses around standard changes provide further evidence that managers make more non‐GAAP adjustments and are more likely to discuss the standard and its underlying transaction in the MD&A when a new standard limits their discretion more than its predecessor. Collectively, our results suggest managers use voluntary disclosure channels to convey information when GAAP limits their ability to recognize such information in financial statements.