Knowledge that Transforms

Theories based on information costs or frictions have become increasing popular in macroeconomics and macro-finance. The literature has used various types of information choices, such as rational inattention, inattentiveness, information markets and costly precision. Using a unified framework, we compare these different information choice technologies and explain why some generate increasing returns and others, particularly those where agents choose how much public information to observe, generate multiple equilibria. The results can help applied theorists to choose the appropriate information choice technology for their application and to understand the consequences of that modeling choice.

The empirical evidence on rational inattention lags the theoretical developments: micro evidence on one of the most immediate consequences of observation costs––the infrequent observation of state variables––is not available in standard datasets. We contribute to filling the gap using new household surveys. To match these data we modify existing models, shifting the focus from nondurable to durable consumption. The model features both observation and transaction costs and implies a mixture of time-dependent and state-dependent rules. Numerical simulations explain the frequencies of trading and observation of the median investor with small observation costs and larger transaction costs.

The paper provides a first analysis of market jump starting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. The government optimally overpays for the legacy assets and cleans up the market of its weakest assets, through a mixture of buybacks and equity injections, and leaves the firms with the strongest legacy assets to the market. The government reduces adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. The existence of a market imposes no welfare cost.

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences.

The cost-effectiveness of cap-and-trade emissions regulations has become widely accepted. A 2009 proposal by Muller and Mendelsohn would replace conventional ton-for-ton trading with trading based on estimates of marginal damages by pollutant and by source. This proposal faces difficulties arising from the negative marginal damage estimates—neglected in Muller and Mendelsohn (2009)—for nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from many urban counties. Such estimates imply nonconvexities in air chemistry that complicate trading and could result in trades that increase emissions by both buyer and seller. Uncertainty in source-specific damages also creates rent-seeking opportunities and the potential for costly litigation. JEL: H53, Q53, Q58

We use experimental measures of time discounting and risk aversion for villagers in south India to highlight behavioral features of microcredit, a financial tool designed to reduce poverty and fix credit market imperfections. The evidence suggests that microcredit contracts may do more than reduce moral hazard and adverse selection by imposing new forms of discipline on borrowers. We find that, conditional on borrowing from any source, women with present-biased preferences are more likely than others to borrow through microcredit institutions. Another particular contribution of microcredit may thus be to provide helpful structure for borrowers seeking self-discipline. JEL: G21, I38, O15, O16, O18

I use bilateral import data to test for and quantify the importance of trade costs and asset market frictions in explaining the failure of perfect international consumption risk sharing. I find that while frictions in international asset markets significantly impede optimal consumption risk sharing between developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2000, developed countries are close to optimal risk sharing with each other. Trade costs, in contrast, significantly impede risk sharing for all countries.

The technological constraints on sustaining production chains have been discussed extensively by development economists, but the role of financial linkages has received less attention. In a model of recursive moral hazard for a manufacturing supply chain, we show that the structure of interlocking receivables and payables serve as the glue for the production chain that sustains complex manufacturing output. The inefficiency associated with recursive moral hazard can be mitigated through optimal delays in payments along the chain. However, efficiency requires large stocks of working capital, and invoice prices are high due to implicit amortization costs of inter-firm credit.

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.