Knowledge that Transforms

Are attitudes about morally controversial (and often prohibited) market transactions affected by information about their costs and benefits? We address this question for the case of payments for human organs. We find in a survey experiment with US residents (N=3,417) that providing information on the potential efficiency benefits of a regulated price mechanism for organs significantly increased support for payments from a baseline of 52 percent to 71 percent. The survey was devised to minimize social desirability biases in responses, and additional analyses validate the interpretation that subjects were reflecting on the case-specific details provided, rather than just reacting to any information.

This paper finds households with children and elderly dependents, the “Sandwich Generation,” significantly reduce both college savings and stockholding. Having any elderly dependents decreases the probability of both stockholding and college savings by twice as much as poor personal health. Hence, these results have critical implications as they demonstrate the importance and magnitude of links between the pension system, college financial aid, and wealth accumulation. Elderly dependents limiting parental funds for offspring education can decrease offspring long-term earnings potential via decreased human capital accumulation. Furthermore, decreased stock holdings can decrease long-term wealth accumulation and thus intergenerational wealth transfers.

We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance, over unknown actions the agent might potentially take. The model assumes risk-neutrality and limited liability, and no other functional form assumptions. Very generally, the optimal contract is linear. The model thus offers a new explanation for linear contracts in practice. It also introduces a flexible modeling approach for moral hazard under nonquantifiable uncertainty. (JEL D81, D82, D86)

Piketty argues that r > g is the “the central contradiction of capitalism” and that it will lead to an “endless inegalitarian spiral.” As a result, he argues for a new global tax on capital. In this brief essay, I explain why I am not persuaded by either his prediction or his prescription.

We analyze a notion of self-confirming equilibrium with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes that generalizes the traditional concept. We show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases. The intuition is quite simple: by playing the same strategy in a stationary environment, an agent learns the implied distribution of payoffs, but alternative strategies yield payoffs with unknown distributions; increased aversion to ambiguity makes such strategies less appealing. In sum, a kind of “status quo bias” emerges; in the long run, the uncertainty related to tested strategies disappears, but the uncertainty implied by the untested ones does not. (JEL C72, C73, D81, D83)

Industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power. To this purpose, it builds models that capture the essence of the situation. The predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field. In the end, the reasonableness of, and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision-makers for intervention, and to companies for the design of their business model. Industrial organization has a long tradition: first theoretical, with the work of French “engineer-economists” Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838) and Jules Dupuit (1844); then policy-oriented with the enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and subsequent legislation; then descriptive with the studies of the Harvard school (“Structure-Conduct-Performance”) comforting and refining the antitrust drive; and finally skeptical with the Chicago school. The Chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice. It however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine, perhaps because

The Affordable Care Act has engendered significant changes in the design of health insurance products. We examine the “narrowness” of hospital networks affiliated with plans offered in the first year of the marketplaces. Using data from Texas, we find limited evidence of a tight link between pricing and a simple measure of network breadth, or a more complex measure of network value derived from a logit model of hospital choice. The state's largest insurer priced its narrow networks at a fairly constant discount relative to its broad networks, notwithstanding significant variation in its broad-narrow gap across geographic markets in Texas.

Drug trade-related violence has escalated dramatically in Mexico since 2007, and recent years have also witnessed large-scale efforts to combat trafficking, spearheaded by Mexico's conservative PAN party. This study examines the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy toward the drug trade. Regression discontinuity estimates show that drug-related violence increases substantially after close elections of PAN mayors. Empirical evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to usurp territories after crackdowns have weakened incumbent criminals. Moreover, the study uses a network model of trafficking routes to show that PAN victories divert drug traffic, increasing violence along alternative drug routes. (JEL D72, D85, K42, O17, Z13)

We propose a unified model of limited market integration, asset-price determination, leveraging, and contagion. Investors and firms are located on a circle, and access to markets involves participation costs that increase with distance. Due to a complementarity between participation and leverage decisions, the equilibrium may exhibit diverse leverage and participation choices across investors, although investors are ex ante identical. Small changes in market-access costs can cause a change in the type of equilibrium, leading to discontinuous price changes, deleveraging, and portfolio-flow reversals. Moreover, the market is subject to contagion—an adverse shock to investors in some locations affects prices everywhere. (JEL D83, G11, G12, G32, G35)

In this article, I present three key facts about income and wealth inequality in the long run emerging from my book Capital in the Twenty-First Century and seek to sharpen and refocus the discussion about those trends. In particular, I clarify the role played by r > g in my analysis of wealth inequality. I also discuss some of the implications for optimal taxation, and the relation between capital-income ratios and capital shares.