Knowledge that Transforms

Central to the economic theory of sticky costs is the proposition that managers consider adjustment costs when changing resource levels. We test this proposition using employment protection legislation (EPL) provisions in different countries as a proxy for labor adjustment costs. Using a large sample of firms in 19 OECD countries during 1990–2008, we find that the degree of cost stickiness at the firm level varies with the strictness of the country-level EPL provisions. This finding supports the theory that cost stickiness reflects the deliberate resource commitment decisions of managers in the presence of adjustment costs.

Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (DGHR, in this issue) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) to elicit their views on earnings quality, broader trends in financial reporting, and the prevalence of earnings management. They provide some interesting insights on these issues. We discuss how CFOs' incentives in the financial reporting process are likely to affect what we can learn from them about earnings quality. We also discuss how DGHR's methodological choices regarding survey sample and question design affect their inferences, including what we can infer about the prevalence and magnitude of earnings management.

Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.

This study investigates the implicit financial incentives of individual Big 4 audit partners by examining the association between a partner's compensation and characteristics of the audit firm, audit partner, and individual partner clientele for Big 4 firms in Sweden. Using tax and financial data for individual audit partners and clients, our empirical findings indicate that there is significant variation in the implicit determinants that are associated with compensation across the Big 4. We find that audit partners’ compensation is positively associated with the size of their clientele or the number of publicly traded clients, both of which represent revenue‐generating opportunities. Similarly, compensation and developing an industry specialization are positively related. In three firms, gaining clients is clearly related to an increase in compensation, while losing a client is associated with a reduction in partner income in only one firm. We find that audit partner income is more sensitive to performance‐related incentives, such as attracting new clients, as partners progress in their career. Finally, we find evidence that audit failures, proxied by reporting errors related to issuing a going concern opinion, are associated with lower compensation. These results should be of interest to the auditing profession, audit firms, and regulators when they consider the effects of implicit incentives of partner compensation on audit quality.

A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise‐linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market‐to‐book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives.

Social psychologists have documented a tendency for people to overestimate their similarity to others. I investigate whether financial analysts' forecast errors are consistent with this bias. I model the bias by assuming analysts overestimate the correlation of the private signals they receive about a firm's future earnings. My model predicts a positive relationship between (i) the likelihood of an analyst's revised forecast being too close to his earlier forecast and (ii) the number of analysts issuing forecasts during the time interval between his two forecasts. I empirically confirm this prediction and consider several alternative explanations.

We investigate whether management's decision regarding the recognition of the valuation allowance (VA) for deferred tax assets provides incremental information about the persistence of accounting losses. We introduce a classification scheme that assigns loss firm‐years into three categories based on whether management appears to have recognized a material change in the VA, and whether or not the firm has positive taxable income (e.g., a net operating loss). The results of our study show that our tax categories contain information about the persistence of accounting losses over the following three years beyond variables previously identified to predict loss persistence. This incremental information is consistent with management using private information about the firm's future prospects in setting the VA. Finally, we find that investors’ pricing of the VA varies with the saliency of the tax signal and the information environment of the firm.

This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.

In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored. This paper examines how two communication mechanisms, market and cheap talk, affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. I find that the market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination failures will occur is self‐fulfilling, while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest alleviate strategic uncertainty.