Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the causal effect of foreign currency dependence on international trade by exploiting Brazil and Argentina's 2008 introduction of a bilateral payments system that eliminated the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency. I identify causal effects using a triple-difference design comparing exports across municipalities with varying bank access and across destinations to control for contemporaneous shocks including the financial crisis. Firm-level analysis finds that local currency adoption increased export values significantly, with effects concentrated among non-commodity exporters. These results demonstrate that foreign currency dependence constitutes a meaningful barrier to emerging market trade.

Most of China's fertility decline predates the famous One Child Policy — and instead occurred under its predecessor, the Wan Xi Shao, or Later, Longer, Fewer (LLF) campaign. Studying LLF's contribution to fertility and sex selection behavior, we find that LLF i) reduced China's total fertility rate by 0.95 births per woman (explaining 30.6% of its fertility decline), ii) doubled the use of male-biased fertility stopping rules, and iii) promoted postnatal selection (implying 180,000 previously unrecognized missing girls, or 19% of the total during our study period). Considering Chinese population policy to be extreme in global experience, our paper demonstrates the limits of population policy — and its potential human costs.

This paper proposes a spatial model of imperfect competition in markets with adverse or advantageous selection. The model shows that a reduction in competition exacerbates the inefficiency created by adverse selection but can ameliorate the inefficiency created by advantageous selection. However, reduced competition never corrects the inefficiency perfectly because it introduces an allocative inefficiency. By contrast, the inefficiency can be corrected perfectly through a corrective tax when there is perfect competition. Our results have implications for competition policy in credit and insurance markets, as they caution against viewing imperfect competition as a solution to the inefficiencies created by selection.

Economics papers increasingly report balance, pretrend, placebo, and other “sniff tests,” rejection of which is bad news for authors, undermining the credibility of their main results. We derive nonparametric bounds on the latent proportion of significant sniff tests removed by the publication process (whether by p-hacking or relegation to the file drawer) and the proportion whose significance was due to true misspecification, not bad luck. Using a hand-collected sample of nearly 30,000 sniff tests, we estimate a removal rate of more than 30% for balance tests in randomized controlled trials and a misspecification rate of more than 40% for other tests.

We show that teachers’ value added (VA) depends on the VA of the teachers who preceded them. To do so, we use administrative data from North Carolina and find that a one-standard deviation increase in last grade’s mean teacher VA causes a 0.08σ decrease in teacher VA. Controlling for prior teacher assignment eliminates this bias. Under a benchmark policy that releases teachers in the bottom 5% of the VA distribution, 32% of teachers are incorrectly released using traditional techniques. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating dynamic features of education production into the estimation of teacher quality.

Close elections are important for many reasons, including that consequent election disputes can weaken democratic legitimacy and risk political violence. We quantify the probability of close outcomes in U.S. presidential races with novel applications of empirical election models from several sources. We show that razor-thin margins are very likely under the Electoral College (EC). And we establish that the EC causes this closeness: It would not occur under any plausibly comparable popular vote system. The tendency of the EC to generate close elections is found today and throughout U.S. presidential voting history.

This paper studies imperfectly perceived private information in insurance markets when contracts endogenously respond. Equilibrium contracts, pooling, and welfare depend on the joint distribution of risk and misperception. In the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I show that misperceptions typically covary with (medical, long-term care, disability, and mortality) risk type: high types underperceive their risk and low types overperceive. I develop a general model and algorithm to estimate the equilibrium contracts, pooling, and welfare impact of misperceptions that is applicable in many settings. I offer suggestive evidence from U.S. annuity markets that contracts are distorted due to misperceptions, with welfare likely increasing.

We empirically assess whether hindsight bias affects citizens’ evaluation of their political actors. Using an incentivized elicitation technique, we demonstrate that people systematically misremember their past policy preferences regarding how to best fight the COVID-19 pandemic. At the peak of the first wave in the United States, the average respondent mistakenly believed that they supported significantly stricter restrictions at the onset of the first wave than they actually did. Exogenous variation in the extent of hindsight bias, induced through a randomized survey experiment, indicates that hindsight bias has a negative causal impact on the change in trust in government.

Using panel data on a 20% random sample of Canadian taxpayers, we study behavioral responses to the cancellation of a lifetime capital gains exemption that resulted in increased capital gains taxation for some individuals. We show that the exemption did not change the number of taxpayers reporting positive capital gains, and thus unlikely resulted in increased participation in capital markets. Furthermore, our results suggest that the cancellation increased the long-run capital gains realizations of tax filers with more unused exemption room but had a small, statistically insignificant impact on the capital gains realizations of those with little unused exemption room.

We investigate whether participants in the patent system are sensitive to information quality by examining how they treat inaccurate information. We use a novel approach to identify patents with inaccurate information: patent-paper pairs where the paper has been retracted and the corresponding patent contains the retracted material. Despite containing inaccurate information, we find that these patents are prosecuted and maintained by many applicants, are not rejected by examiners, and continue to be cited by some downstream readers after retraction. Insensitivity to inaccurate information may lead to erroneous decisions during examination and has implications for patent quality, disclosure, and knowledge flows.