We investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms' use of external financing to fund growth. We show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of firms use long‐term external financing. An active, though not necessarily large, stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth. The increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well‐functioning institutions have lower profit rates. Government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing.

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

Using a sample of 70 former colonies, this paper assesses two theories regarding the historical determinants of financial development. The law and finance theory holds that legal traditions, brought by colonizers, differ in terms of protecting the rights of private investors vis-à-vis the state, with important implications for financial markets. The endowment theory argues that the disease environment encountered by colonizers influences the formation of long-lasting institutions that shape financial development. The empirical results provide evidence for both theories. However, initial endowments explain more of the cross-country variation in financial intermediary and stock market development.

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.

Theory does not predict an unambiguous relationship between a country’s financial and legal institutions and firm size. Using data on the largest industrial firms for 44 countries, we find that firm size is positively related to financial intermediary development, the efficiency of the legal system and property rights protection. We do not find any evidence that firms are larger in order to internalize the functions of the banking system or to compensate for the general inefficiency of the legal system.

Using a proprietary data set on international private equity activity, we study the determinants of buyout investments across 61 countries and 19 industries over the period of 1990 to 2017. We find that countries with cyclically strong economies, more active stock and credit markets, and better rule of law experience more buyout activity. Countries also receive more buyout capital following investor protection and contract enforcement reforms. The set of determinants we identify appear somewhat unique to buyout investments, because other forms of investment such as foreign direct investment, gross capital formation, investments in R&D, and M&A activity do not respond similarly to these factors.

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.

For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return on equity, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. We show that bank returns increase with absolute size, yet decline with systemic size, while neither size measure is associated with bank risk as implicit in the Z-score. These results are consistent with the view that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of bank shareholders. We also find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, consistent with the view that they can become too large to save. A bank’s interest costs, however, are estimated to decline with bank systemic size for all banks apart from those with very low capitalization levels. This suggests that market discipline, exercised through funding costs, does not prevent banks from attaining larger systemic size.

This paper identifies factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a comprehensive data set covering 180 countries during the 1960–2003 period. Our analysis focuses on how private interest-group pressures, outside influences, and political-institutional factors affect deposit-insurance adoption and design. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks, quality of bank regulations, and institutional development, we find that both private and public interests, as well as outside pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory schemes, can explain the timing of adoption decisions and the rigor of loss-control arrangements. Controlling for other factors, political systems that facilitate intersectoral power sharing dispose a country toward design features that accommodate risk-shifting by banks.