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A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models

Journal of Accounting Research 1996 34, 83
In this study we specify a simple earnings model, present managerial discretion hypotheses from existing literature, and assume efficient markets in order to evaluate five discretionary-accrual models. The five discretionary accrual models are the same as those evaluated in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]. The models are Healy [1985]; DeAngelo [1986]; Jones [1991]; Jones as modified in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]; and the industry model proposed by Dechow and Sloan [1991]. We specify three managerial discretion hypotheses. First, under the performance measure hypothesis, discretionary accruals help managers produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance (i.e., earnings) than using nondiscretionary accruals alone. Second, the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis is that discretionary accruals are employed to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, discretionary accruals are noise in earnings. This is the noise hypothesis. Our contribution is to make the joint hypotheses explicit and generate explicit predictions about the relative variability of earnings components,

Decentralization of the firm: theory and evidence

Journal of Corporate Finance 2003 9(1), 3-36
Value maximization requires either that knowledge is transferred to those with the right to make decisions, or that decision rights are transferred to those who have the knowledge. A tradeoff of knowledge transfer costs and control costs is required. Characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets (IOSs) that affect knowledge transfer costs and control costs are identified. Testable predictions about the relations between these characteristics and firms' decentralization decisions are developed and tested. The evidence presented is consistent with our predictions and is robust to different ways of measuring variables.

Stock prices and top management changes

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 20, 461-492
This paper studies the association between a firm's stock returns and subsequent top management changes. Consistent with internal monitoring of management, there is an inverse relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's share performance. This relation can result from monitoring by the board, other top managers, or blockholders. However, unless share performance is extremely good or bad, logit models have no predictive ability. No average stock price reaction is detected at announcement of a top management change.

Economic Determinants of the Relation Between Earnings Changes and Stock Returns.

The Accounting Review 1993 68(3), 622-638
In competitive product markets, product prices and thus firms' revenues incorporate the cost of equity capital. In a competitive capital market, the cost of equity capital (the expected return on equity) increases with the risk of firms' Investments. Because accounting earnings are calculated without deducting the cost of equity capital, they are expected to be an increasing function of firms' investment risks. This simple competitive equilibrium analysis predicts a positive relation between changes in investment risk and expected earnings. The presence of corporate debt complicates the analysis because leverage effects seem likely to affect the relation between changes in investment risk and expected earnings. Using annual earnings and return data from 1950 to 1988, we document a statistically significant positive association between changes in equities' relative risks and in earnings. However, on average, only a small proportion of changes in earnings can be attributed to changes in risk. A much larger proportion is attributable to changes in economic rents (windfall gains and losses). The observed positive association between changes in earnings and changes in equities' risks suggests that leverage effects do not fully offset the effect of changes in investment risks. This association is robust with respect to subperiod analysis, alternative specifications of the earnings change variable, alternative data-availability requirements, and the number of portfolios formed.