We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.

We present a model of equilibrium allocation of capital for arbitrage. If asset prices may fall low enough, it is profitable to carry liquid capital to acquire assets in such states. Set against this, keeping capital in liquid form entails costs in terms of foregone profitable investments. This trade-off generates occasional fire sales and limited arbitrage capital as robust phenomena. With learning-by-doing effects, arbitrage capital moves in to acquire assets only if fire sales are steep. However, once arbitrage capital finds it profitable to acquire assets, it requires similar returns elsewhere, inducing contagious fire-sale prices even for unrelated assets.

We consider a model in which the threat of bank liquidations by creditors as well as equity-based compensation incentives both discipline bankers, but with different consequences. Greater use of equity leads to lower ex-ante bank liquidity, whereas greater use of debt leads to a higher probability of inefficient bank liquidation. The bank's privately-optimal capital structure trades off these two costs. With uncertainty about aggregate risk, bank creditors learn from other banks’ liquidation decisions. Such inference can lead to contagious liquidations, some of which are inefficient; this is a negative externality that is ignored in privately-optimal bank capital structures. Thus, under plausible conditions, banks choose excessive leverage relative to the socially optimal level, providing a rationale for bank capital regulation. While a blanket regulatory forbearance policy can eliminate contagion, it also eliminates all market discipline. However, a regulator generating its own information about aggregate risk, rather than relying on market signals, can restore efficiency and market discipline by intervening selectively.

We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973–2007 in a regime-switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008–2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don't know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns.

We establish that macroprudential controls limiting capital flows can curb risks arising from foreign currency borrowing by corporates in emerging markets. Firm-level data show that Indian firms tend to issue more foreign currency debt when the interest rate differential between India and the U.S. is higher. This “carry trade” relationship, however, breaks down once regulators institute more stringent interest rate caps on borrowing; in response, riskier borrowers cut issuance most. Prior to adoption of this macroprudential measure, stock price exposure of issuers to currency risk rises after issuance, as witnessed during the “taper tantrum” episode of 2013; this source of vulnerability is nullified by the measure, as confirmed during the October 2018 oil price shock and the COVID-19 outbreak. We find no evidence of the policy’s efficacy being undermined by leakage or regulatory arbitrage.

We analyze government interventions in the eurozone banking sector during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Using a novel data set, we document that fiscally constrained governments “kicked the can down the road” by providing banks with guarantees instead of fully-fledged recapitalizations. We econometrically address the endogeneity associated with bailout decisions in identifying their consequences. We find that forbearance prompted undercapitalized banks to shift their assets from loans to risky sovereign debt and engage in zombie lending, resulting in weaker credit supply, elevated risk in the banking sector, and, eventually, a greater reliance on liquidity support from the European Central Bank.

The use of accounting measures and disclosures in banks’ contracts and regulation suggests that the quality of banks’ financial reporting is central to the efficacy of market discipline and nonmarket mechanisms in limiting banks’ development of debt and risk overhangs in economic good times and in mitigating the adverse consequences of those overhangs for the stability of the financial system in downturns. This essay examines how research on banks’ financial reporting, informed by the financial economics literature on banking, can generate insights about how to enhance the stability of the financial system. We begin with a foundational discussion of how aspects of banks’ accounting and disclosures may affect stability. We then evaluate representative papers in the empirical literature on banks’ financial reporting and stability, pointing out the research design issues that empirical accounting researchers need to confront to develop well‐specified tests able to generate reliably interpretable findings. To this end, we provide examples of settings amenable to addressing these issues. We conclude with considerations for accounting standard setters and financial system policy makers.

We investigate the impact of bankruptcy codes on firms’ capital-structure choices. We develop a theoretical model to identify how firm characteristics may interact with the bankruptcy code in determining optimal capital structures. A novel and sharp empirical implication emerges from this model: that the difference in leverage choices under a relatively equity-friendly bankruptcy code (such as the US’s) and one that is relatively more debt-friendly (such as the UK’s) should be a decreasing function of the anticipated liquidation value of the firm’s assets. Using data on the US and the UK over the period 1990–2002, we subject this prediction to both parametric and non-parametric tests, using different proxies for liquidation values and different measures of leverage. In support for the theory, we find that our proxies for liquidation value are both statistically and economically significant in explaining leverage differences across the two countries. In contrast, many of the other factors that are known to affect within-country leverage (e.g., size) cannot explain differences in leverage across countries.

Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, a greater number of insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation features detection and punishment policies that become stricter as the number of insiders increases, reducing insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts during the period 2000–2006 and relate these to the number of financing participants. Suspicious stock and options activity is associated with more equity participants, while suspicious bond and CDS activity is associated with more debt participants — consistent with models of limited competition among insiders but inconsistent with our model of optimal regulation.