We investigate the effect of a stock market liberalization on industry growth in emerging markets. Consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, we find that industries that are more externally dependent and face better growth opportunities grew faster following liberalization. However, this growth increase appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of financially constrained new firms. We show that following liberalization, new firm growth occurs in countries and industries with lower entry barriers. Hence, liberalization has a more uniform growth impact if accompanied by competition-enhancing reforms.

This study examines the determinants and interrelationships among corporate ownership and board structure characteristics using a sample of Singapore listed firms. The institutional environment in Singapore differs from that in many developed Western economies in several important respects, including a weak market for corporate control, more concentrated stock ownership, and significant government ownership in many private sector firms. Three characteristics—board composition, board leadership structure and board size—are used to capture the monitoring ability of the board. These board characteristics are assumed to be endogenously determined, together with two ownership characteristics, managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. We use two-stage least squares regression to estimate the determinants of board and ownership characteristics. Our findings indicate that corporate ownership and board structures are related, and that there are significant interrelationships among board structure characteristics. The proportion of outside directors is negatively related to managerial ownership, board size and government ownership. The use of a dual leadership structure is positively related to blockholder ownership, and negatively related to regulation and to CEO tenure.

This study extends the theoretical model of dynamic investment, dividend payout, costly external financing, and liquidation for financially constrained firms by incorporating ambiguity. We demonstrate that ambiguity aversion induces a trade-off between the “bird-in-hand” effect and an amplified precautionary motive in determining firms’ cash management, which consequently affects firms’ investment, dividend payout, costly external financing, and liquidation decisions. Unlike the models considering risk only, we identify a non-monotonic relationship between the endogenous payout boundary and ambiguity aversion. Our model generates several new implications, including providing an explanation for the high cash holdings and speed-up of asset sales during the recent COVID-19 crisis.

We study a panel data model with heterogeneous effects, allowing slopes to vary across individuals and time. To reduce dimensionality, we assume these slopes follow a factor structure, so slope matrices can be estimated via low-rank regularized regression. We propose a multi-step estimation procedure incorporating sample splitting and partialing-out to enable valid inference after penalized estimation. We establish the asymptotic normality of the resulting estimator, facilitating inference for individualtime- specific effects and their cross-sectional averages. The method’s performance is illustrated through simulations and an empirical application.

We provide empirical evidence that stock market crises are spread globally through asset holdings of international investors. By separating emerging market stocks into two categories, namely, those that are eligible for purchase by foreigners (accessible) and those that are not (inaccessible), we estimate and compare the degree to which accessible and inaccessible stock index returns co‐move with crisis country index returns. Our results show greater co‐movement during high volatility periods, especially for accessible stock index returns, suggesting that crises spread through the asset holdings of international investors rather than through changes in fundamentals.

Political connections provide firms with legal advantages and can shield managers and directors away from litigation risk. Using a sample of Chinese public firms, we find that politically connected firms have lower demand for the directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance). The association is robust to Heckman two-step selection model, an examination of market reaction to the departure of politically connected managers, a difference-in-differences analysis surrounding the hiring of a politically connected CEO, and controlling for firm performance. The effect is attenuated for firms in regions with strong market development and legal environment, but is accentuated for firms that are less socially important to the local government. Our findings highlight a substitution effect between political connections and D&O insurance in protecting managers and directors against legal liability, and advance our understanding of the key drivers of D&O insurance purchase in emerging markets.

This paper proposes a robust method for semiparametric identification and estimation in panel multinomial choice models, where we allow for infinite-dimensional fixed effects that enter into consumer utilities in an additively nonseparable way, thus incorporating rich forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Our identification strategy exploits multivariate monotonicity in parametric indices, and uses the logical contraposition of an intertemporal inequality on choice probabilities to obtain identifying restrictions. We provide a consistent estimation procedure, and demonstrate the practical advantages of our method with Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical illustration on popcorn sales with the NielsenIQ data.

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.

This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.