Knowledge that Transforms

Angus Deaton delivered his Prize Lecture on Tuesday 8 December 2015, at the Aula Magna, Stockholm University. These are the lecture slides.

US government bonds are considered to be the world's safe store of value, especially during periods of economic turmoil such as the events of 2008. But what makes US government bonds “safe assets”? We highlight coordination among investors, and build a model in which two countries with heterogeneous sizes issue bonds that may be chosen as safe asset. Our model illustrates the benefit of a large absolute debt size as safe asset investors have “nowhere else to go” in equilibrium, and the large country's bonds are chosen as the safe asset. Moreover, the effect becomes stronger in crisis periods.

The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses. We estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations across currently single retirees. Compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value Medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost, but that most would value an expansion of the current Medicaid program at less than its cost. These findings suggest that for current single retirees, the Medicaid program may be of the approximately right size.

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.

We provide an explanation for the large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India based on the trade-off between consumption smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income gains from migration. Our theory generates two key empirically verified predictions: (i) males in relatively wealthy households within a caste who benefit less from the redistributive (surplus-maximizing) network will be more likely to migrate, and (ii) males in households facing greater rural income risk (who benefit more from the insurance network) migrate less. Structural estimates show that small improvements in formal insurance decrease the spatial misallocation of labor by substantially increasing migration. (JEL G22, J31, J61, O15, O18, R23, Z13)

This paper reports on effects of recent administrative reforms at the European Patent Office (EPO). In EPO-granted patents, claims numbers started to decline in 2008 when new claims fees became effective, claims sections in patents became shorter, and independent claims longer and presumably more specific. The grant rate remained at relatively low levels, but the EPO was unable to stem the use of divisional filings. The developments at the EPO point to a high private value of delay options. Delay may be achieved either by making use of explicit statutory rules or by other means, such as filing divisional applications.

The goal of this paper is to outline the major tensions between the monopoly face of licensing versus potential consumer protection goals of occupational regulation in the health care industry. Historically, health care occupations limited supply as a method of raising earnings, but with the growth in the number of newly regulated occupations, many professions have come in conflict over who gets to do the work. Rather than having consumers decide, state legislatures and licensing boards determine the allocation of tasks. The paper outlines policies that may allow consumers rather than service providers determine the direct allocation of these jobs.

This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability that is central to conventional game theory. We argue here that learning others' preferences allows individuals to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Agents with the ability to learn have a sharp, unambiguous advantage over those who are less sophisticated because the former agents extrapolate to novel circumstances information about opponents' preferences that was learned previously. This advantage holds even with a suitably small cost to reflect the additional cognitive complexity involved. (JEL C73, D11, D83)

Much has happened in the world of central banking in the past decade. In this paper, I focus on three issues associated with the zero lower bound (ZLB) on short-term nominal interest rates and the nexus between monetary policy and financial stability: 1) whether we are moving toward a permanently lower long-run equilibrium real interest rate; 2) what steps can be taken to mitigate the constraints imposed by the ZLB; and 3) whether and how financial stability considerations should be incorporated in the conduct of monetary policy. These important topics deserve the attention of both academic and government professionals.

Anthropologists have documented substantial and persistent differences in food preferences across social groups. My paper asks whether such food cultures can constrain caloric intake? I first document that interstate migrants within India consume fewer calories per rupee of food expenditure compared to their neighbors. Second, I show that migrants bring their origin-state food preferences with them. Third, I link these findings by showing that the gap in caloric intake between locals and migrants depends on the suitability and intensity of the migrants' origin-state preferences. The most affected migrants would consume seven percent more calories if they possessed their neighbors' preferences. (JEL D12, I12, O15, R23, Z12, Z13)