To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:

Population and Economic Growth

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 145-149
This paper examines the relationship between population and economic growth. It analyzes the implications of the effects of higher population density on per capita incomes and other variables in different countries and other geographic regions. Several statistical models that interpolate population to cities investment in human capital and economic growth were utilized to help analyze population growth. Generally economists along with others have believed that higher population lowers per capita incomes by diminishing returns. On the contrary there are few proofs demonstrating that higher population in more developed economies reduce per capita incomes. Population may reduce productivity secondary to traditional diminishing returns from more intensive use of land and other natural resources. However large populations encourage greater specialization and increased investments in knowledge. Therefore the net relation between greater population and per capita incomes relies on whether the inducements to human capital and expansion of knowledge are stronger than diminishing returns to natural resources.

Gary Becker Remembered

Journal of Political Economy 2018 126(S1), S1-S6
Gary Becker was an intellectual giant. No one had a greater impact on broadening economics and making its impact felt throughout the social sciences thanBecker. Indeed,MiltonFriedmanoncedescribedGaryBecker as the most important social scientist of the second half of the twentieth century. For those of us who knew him, he was themost creative thinker we ever encountered. It was his astounding imagination that made many of his early critics think of him as a heretic. They were correct: he was a heretic much like Luther, Copernicus, and Galileo, who transformed their worlds, just ashe transformedeconomics.Hebrought a rigorous and insightful approach to issues that were viewed as inherently noneconomic. Eventually, he won over the economics profession, detractors and all, who eventually became converts. Becker was a scientist in the true sense of the word.He believed that economics was useful only if it explained andhelped to improve theworld.He practiced what he preached and carefully analyzed all of the social problems he addressed. He was innovative yet rigorous, open to new thought yet disciplined in sticking to the established rules of analysis. Most importantly, he extended the boundaries of economics tomuch of social science.

Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options

American Economic Review 2000 90(2), 209-214
Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at (or near) the grant-date market price. We provide an operationally useful alternative to Black-Scholes (1973) for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options. Our framework has implications not only for exercise-price policies, but also for indexed options, option repricings, exchanges of cash for stock-based compensation, and the design of bonus plans.

A Competitive Perspective on Internet Explorer

American Economic Review 2000 90(2), 184-187
Microsoft's Internet Explorer (JE) technologies are included in Windows at no separate charge. Versions 1 and 2 of IE functioned as add-on features in Windows 95. They were not tightly integrated into Windows and did not make applications programming interfaces available to other software. Over time, IE became increasingly integrated into Windows, sharing code with other Windows features and supplying processing services to other operatingsystem components and to software applications. In addition to distribution as part of Windows, Microsoft has routinely offered free IE distribution and upgrades through other channels. Microsoft has also compensated internet access providers (IAP's) and internet content providers (ICP' s) for their efforts to promote the use and distribution of IE. Despite IE's no-revenue track record and assurances of free availability in the future, Microsoft spends large sums developing and promoting IE. One interpretation of these (and other) facts holds that Microsoft unlawfully tied the browsing functionality of IE to Windows 95 and 98 for anticompetitive purposes. This view rests on the premise that a non-Microsoft web browser could evolve into a substitute for Windows or promote potential substitutes. Of course, the emergence of a substitute would erode the profitability of Windows. Hence, according to this view, Microsoft sought to preclude or forestall the emergence of alternative software platforms by tying its own web browser to Windows and by entering into promotional agreements that raise costs for rival web browsers. As an alternative to this view, we offer a pro-competitive perspective on Microsoft's behavior with respect to IE. Our perspective resonates with several other aspects of Microsoft's behavior as well. It also carries important implications for the connection between market structure and consumer welfare.

Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives

Journal of Political Economy 1990 98(2), 225-264
The authors' estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholding, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 changes in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of the firms' stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past fifty years. The authors hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis.

Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?

American Economic Review 2001 91(2), 212-218
Academics, consultants, and practitioners have long advocated bringing the market inside the firm. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s economists proposed that the transfer-pricing problem should be solved by charging market prices for internal transactions. Similarly, in the 1980s, financial economists suggested that the capital-allocation problem should be solved by charging the external cost of capital for internal investments. And wave after wave of organizational restructuring has advocated radical decentralization, empowerment, “intrapreneurship, ” and the like—in short, making employees feel like owners. Proponents of making transactions within firms more market-like often seem to ignore the factors that brought these transactions inside firms in the first place. But Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991, 1994), Holmstrom and Jean Tirole (1991), and Holmstrom (1999) [hereafter collectively HMT] remind us that in some cases integration is efficient precisely because it eliminates market incentives. In such cases, bringing the market inside the firm would clearly be undesirable. In this paper we show that bringing the market inside the firm is often not feasible, even if it would be desirable. More precisely, if some aspects of the market transaction are non-contractible (as we define below) then it is impossible to replicate spot-market payoffs inside a firm. This result would be trivial if the firm’s only instruments were court-enforceable contracts: it is impossible (by definition) for such contracts to replicate payoffs that were non-contractible in a spot market. Our

Social Status, Education, and Growth

Journal of Political Economy 1996 104(1), 108-132
This paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth. The authors consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers: nonwage income and innate ability. A greater emphasis on status may induce the 'wrong' individuals, that is, those with low ability and high wealth, to acquire schooling, causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth-enhancing industries. This crowding-out effect, taken alone, discourages growth. Growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, which reduces the demand for status.

Industrialization and the Big Push

Journal of Political Economy 1989 97(5), 1003-1026
This paper explores Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan's idea that simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be profitable for them all even when no sector can break even industrializing alone. The authors analyze this idea in the context of an imperfectly-competitive economy with aggregate demand spillovers, and interpret the big push into industrialization as a move from a bad to a good equilibrium. They present three mechanisms for generating a big push and discuss their relevance for less-developed countries.

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

Journal of Finance 1988
A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory—including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion-based incentive systems, the absence of up-front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic—focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.