This study investigates the association between managerial ability and cost rigidity. Cost rigidity refers to the relative proportion of fixed and variable costs. We expect that high‐ability managers will assess the potential upside congestion and downside default risks and choose an appropriate level of cost rigidity accordingly. Our results show that, on average, high‐ability managers tend to adopt a more rigid cost structure because they are more likely to realize favorable demand, and therefore, they retain higher capacity with more fixed inputs to alleviate potential congestion risk. We further document that firms with high‐ability managers will exhibit a higher (lower) level of cost rigidity when facing higher congestion risk (default risk). Our results are robust to using a propensity score matching method, a CEO turnover subsample, and alternative measures of cost rigidity and managerial ability. Taken together, this study suggests that firms' capacity management choices vary with the level of managerial ability.

The balanced scorecard provides a framework for selecting multiple performance measures that supplement traditional financial measures with operating measures of customer satisfaction, internal processes, and learning and growth activities. An essential aspect of the balanced scorecard lies in its articulation of the linkage between performance measures and business strategy. This study conducts an experiment to assess how individuals' evaluations of the performance of business unit managers depend on strategically linked performance measures of a balanced scorecard. Statistical test results indicate that performance evaluations are influenced by strategically linked measures more than non-linked measures only when evaluators are provided detailed information about business unit strategies. The results also confirm Lipe and Salterio's (2000) finding that evaluators rely more on common measures than on unique measures. Evaluators rely more on strategically linked measures than on common measures when they are provided information on strategic linkages, but the reverse relation holds when they are not.

We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort—namely, the pay–performance sensitivity—must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal's expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, and the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.

This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993–2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus is not. As the model suggests, salary is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent, and is positively correlated over time to reflect ability. Bonus serves to address moral hazard and adverse selection by separating high-ability agents into riskier contracts. Our results indicate that it is important to disaggregate cash compensation into salary and bonus components to understand the dynamic interaction between incentives and performance. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.