The average annual inflation-adjusted amount paid out through dividends and repurchases by public industrial firms is more than three times larger from 2000 to 2019 than from 1971 to 1999. We find that an increase in aggregate corporate income accounts for 37% of the increase in aggregate annual payouts, and an increase in the payout rate accounts for 63%. Firms have higher payout rates in the 2000s not only because they are older, larger, and have more free cash flow, but also because they pay out more of their free cash flow. Though firms spend less on capital expenditures in the 2000s than before, capital expenditures decrease similarly for firms with payouts and for firms without.

Liquidity production is a central function of banks. High leverage is optimal for banks in a model that has just enough frictions for banks to have a meaningful role in liquid-claim production. The model has a market premium for (socially valuable) safe/liquid debt, but no taxes or other traditional motives to lever up. Because only safe debt commands a liquidity premium, banks with risky assets use risk management to maximize their capacity to include such debt in the capital structure. The model can explain why banks have higher leverage than most operating firms, why risk management is central to banks׳ operating policies, why bank leverage increased over the last 150 years or so, and why leverage limits for regulated banks impede their ability to compete with unregulated shadow banks.

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.

Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries.

This paper investigates the impact on bank stock prices of emerging market currency crises and bailouts. The stock market distinguishes between banks with exposure to a crisis country and other banks. In general, banks with exposures to a crisis country are affected adversely by currency events and positively by bailouts. Other banks are mostly unaffected by events in countries experiencing a crisis. The paper uses the impact of the LTCM crisis on bank stock prices to put the emerging market events in perspective. The LTCM crisis had no significant contagion effects in the banking sector either, but banks that participated in the LTCM rescue experienced negative stock returns when the rescue was announced.

During the recent financial crisis, corporate borrowing and capital expenditures fall sharply. Most existing research links the two phenomena by arguing that a shock to bank lending (or, more generally, to the corporate credit supply) caused a reduction in capital expenditures. The economic significance of this causal link is tenuous, as we find that (1) bank-dependent firms do not decrease capital expenditures more than matching firms in the first year of the crisis or in the two quarters after Lehman Brother's bankruptcy; (2) firms that are unlevered before the crisis decrease capital expenditures during the crisis as much as matching firms and, proportionately, more than highly levered firms; (3) the decrease in net debt issuance for bank-dependent firms is not greater than for matching firms; (4) the average cumulative decrease in net equity issuance is more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance from the start of the crisis through March 2009; and (5) bank-dependent firms hoard cash during the crisis compared with unlevered firms.

This paper studies stock ownership in Japanese firms by non-Japanese investors from 1975 to 1991. Existing models predicting that foreign investors hold national market portfolios or portfolios tilted towards stocks with high expected returns are inconsistent with our evidence. We document that foreign investors hold disproportionately more shares of firms in manufacturing industries, large firms, and firms with good accounting performance, low unsystematic risk, and low leverage. Controlling for size, there is evidence that small firms that export more firms with greater share turnover, and firms that have ADRs have greater foreign ownership.

This article systematically examines the importance of exchange rate movements and industry competition for stock returns. Common shocks to industries across countries are more important than competitive shocks due to changes in exchange rates. Weekly exchange rate shocks explain almost nothing of the relative performance of industries. Using returns measured over longer horizons, the importance of exchange rate shocks increases slightly and the importance of industry common shocks increases more substantially. Both industry and exchange rate shocks are more important for industries that produce internationally traded goods, but the importance of these shocks is economically small for these industries as well.

In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders.We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium.We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders.This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio.In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power.This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

Both a firm's market-timing opportunities and its corporate lifecycle stage exert statistically and economically significant influences on the probability that it conducts a seasoned equity offering (SEO), with the lifecycle effect empirically stronger. Neither effect adequately explains SEO decisions because a near-majority of issuers are not growth firms and the vast majority of firms with high M/B ratios and high recent and poor future stock returns fail to issue stock. Since without the offer proceeds 62.6% of issuers would run out of cash (81.1% would have subnormal cash balances) the year after the SEO, a near-term cash need is the primary SEO motive, with market-timing opportunities and lifecycle stage exerting only ancillary influences.