Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the exercise of employee stock options (ESOs) by executive officers. We document a positive relation between the variance of ESO returns and the remaining life of the option at exercise, and show that the strength of the relation is reduced by the extent the firm hedges the returns on the ESO. We thus provide empirical evidence of a link between an ESO's expected term and its investment risk to the executive, and document that some firms provide a hedge against option risk.

Using a sample of LIFO users, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of adopting a simultaneous equations approach to study managers' adjustments of interacting accounting measures that meet multiple objectives. We focus on the importance of considering differences in the costs and the effectiveness of adjusting accounting measures. In addition, we examine managers' objectives in subsequent years and how adjustments' reversals affect those objectives. Although generally consistent with earlier studies of LIFO inventory adjustments, our results indicate that modelling interacting accounting measures, such as other current accruals and depreciation, leads to differing conclusions about the role of taxes.

Short-window earnings response coefficients estimated from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions are systematically smaller than corresponding averages of firm-specific coefficients estimated from time-series regressions. The cause is a negative relation between firm-specific earnings response coefficients and unexpected earnings variances. If the hypotheses of equality of firm-specific coefficients and equality of firm-specific unexpected earnings variances are rejected, firm-specific estimation should be used instead of pooled estimation. Using pooled estimation may lead to incorrect inferences about the magnitude of estimated coefficients and/or incorrect inferences about differences in coefficient behavior between groups of firms.

This paper examines if the stock market prices discretionary accruals. Evidence reveals that, on average, the market attaches value to discretionary accruals. This evidence is consistent with two alternative scenarios: (1) managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic value, and (2) discretionary accruals are opportunistic and value-irrelevant but priced by an inefficient market. Further evidence is consistent with the former explanation. There is evidence of pervasive income smoothing, which improves the persistence and predictability of reported earnings. There is also evidence that discretionary accruals predict future profitability and dividend changes. Despite several sensitivity checks, measurement error in the discretionary accruals proxy is an alternative explanation for the results.

This study examines the association between stock returns and foreign GAAP earnings versus earnings adjusted to U.S. GAAP. Using a sample of foreign firms with common stock or American Depositary Receipt (ADR) traded in U.S. exchanges, we compare the returns-earnings relations between U.S. and foreign GAAP-based earnings. Results based on the JA test indicate that earnings based on foreign GAAP are more closely associated with contemporaneous stock returns than earnings reconciled to U.S. GAAP. We find evidence that our results may be driven by institutional factors which are specific to foreign markets.

This paper analyzes security returns of bank holding companies and insurance companies during periods surrounding the adoption of SFAS 115. We find bank share prices were negatively affected by the examined events, but find little share price reaction for insurance companies. Our evidence suggests banks were adversely affected by the standard because of problems with the standard's market value accounting approach. Cross-sectional analysis of event period returns shows that banks that more frequently traded their investments, with longer maturing investments, and that are more fully hedged against interest rate changes, were the most negatively impacted by the standard.

This paper examines the impact of twenty-three pronouncements related to fair value accounting (FVA) rules on equity prices of financial institutions. The results document that announcements that signal an increased (decreased) probability of issuance of FVA standards produce negative (positive) abnormal stock price reactions for sample banks. Further, the magnitude of the stock price reactions is negatively related to a bank's primary capital ratio and positively related to the ratio of the book value of the investment portfolio to total assets and the ratio of the difference between the market and book value of the investment portfolio to total assets.

We extend the contracting paradigm advanced in Smith and Watts (1992) to consider cross-sectional associations between investment opportunities and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance measures. We predict stronger associations between compensation and performance for firms with greater investment opportunities. We also predict greater use of market-based, rather than accounting-based, performance indicators as a basis for incentive payments when investment opportunities are substantial components of firm value. Results for specifications of 1992 and 1993 changes in compensation paid to CEOs of 1,249 publicly-traded U.S. firms are consistent with these hypotheses.

This study investigates whether investors incorporate the value of a firm's outstanding employee stock options into its stock price. I estimate the outstanding options' value for a sample of firms for which outstanding fixed options exceed 5% of outstanding common shares in 1988. I find a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and a firm's share price. The correlation is stronger (i) for the option's intrinsic value than for the option's time value, (ii) for options that are later in their vesting stage than earlier in their vesting stage, and (iii) for large firms than for small firms. In addition, the FASB's method for calculating compensation expense has no explanatory power in the presence of this paper's calculation of the options' value.

Research has shown that managers display self-serving behavior in a variety of discretionary information production decisions. We test whether such behavior is also manifest in discretionary information disclosure decisions — in particular, in the common stock return performance comparisons now required in corporate proxy statements. We find evidence that the industry and peer-company stock return benchmarks, and broader market indices, chosen by management for those comparisons are downward biased, thereby overstating relative reporting-firm performance. Cross-sectionally, the extent of the bias varies with key reporting-firm attributes, including firm performance and the character of firm ownership structure.