Knowledge that Transforms

This paper focuses on the strategic role of corporate venture financing carried out by a corporation (a headquarter). When the headquarter finances a venture through its corporate venture-financing arm, it can increase the complementarity between products of the venture and the headquarter. The effect of having an increase in complementarity is a softening of ex post product market competition with rival products. Hence, in deciding whether to finance the venture, the headquarter faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, being more aggressive ex post in the product market, and, on the other hand, using venture financing to soften ex post competition with substitute products.

Forward rates of European currencies against the private and official ECU exhibit a bias similar to the one found in other data: the Cumby–Obstfeld–Fama (COF) regression coefficients are systematically below unity, and two thirds of them are negative. We use the discount of the private ECU relative to the official ECU as a measure of market scepticism or mistrust. In one view, this sentiment is based on peso risk: fears of realignments, and possibly also the risk of a meltdown of the private ECU relative to the official one. Alternatively, the discount just reflects fads and fashions. Dichotomizing the data on the basis of the size of the discount in the private ECU, we find that the COF beta strongly depends on the degree of mistrust and that the negative COF coefficients are generated by typically less than 20% of the data. But the pattern fits the fads and fashion view better than the peso theory. If the sentiment factor contains a conventional risk premium at all, then this risk premium is definitely not the one predicted by Bansal [Bansal, R., 1997. An exploration of the forward premium puzzle in currency markets. Review of Financial Studies 10, 369–403]. Nor is the sentiment factor proxying for Huisman et al.’s [Huisman, R., Koedijk, K., Kool, C., Nissen, F., 1998. Extreme support for uncovered interest parity. Journal of International Money and Finance 17, 211–228] transaction-cost effects.

It has been claimed that the ability of emerging markets to adopt optimal stabilization policies is hampered by a number of factors. Among them, it has been recently emphasized the role of financial instability, inefficiencies, and financial market imperfections. It is claimed here that the current financial regulatory paradigm, embodied in Basel II, may improve financial stability but reinforces cyclicality. Therefore, countries should emphasize financial efficiency since it would lead to enhanced financial stability, without increasing cyclicality.

This study compares the issuance costs of Eurobonds before and after the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2002. We find that the introduction of the Euro has significantly reduced the issue cost of Euro-denominated bonds compared to bonds denominated in the legacy currencies. The reduction in issue cost is not due to a decrease in underwriter compensation, but rather to the elimination of underpricing (the difference between the market price after trading commences and the offering price). Underwriter fee has declined substantially after the completion of the EMU, but this decline has been offset by an increase in underwriter spread (the difference between the offering price and the guaranteed price to the issuer), leaving total underwriter compensation unchanged. The EMU is also associated with significant reductions in bond maturity and syndicate size, consistent with its expected effects on liquidity and issue costs in the Eurobond market.

Utilizing a bank-lending channel framework, we investigate the effects of expansionary and contractionary policy separately on the loan behavior of low-capital and high-capital banks, and between pre-Basel/FDICIA and post-Basel/FDICIA periods. Our results show that low-capital banks are adversely affected by contractionary policy. Expansionary policy, however, is not effective in stimulating the loan growth of low-capital banks. These results are consistent with lending channel predictions, but only hold in the post-Basel/FDICIA period when the capital constraint is stringent relative to the pre-Basel/FDICIA period. These asymmetric policy results have implications for the interaction of monetary and capital regulatory policies.

We examine whether foreign and domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe react differently to business cycles and banking crises. Our panel dataset comprises data of more than 250 banks for the period 1993–2000, with information on bank ownership and mode of entry. During crisis periods domestic banks contracted their credit base, whereas greenfield foreign banks did not. Also, home country conditions matter for foreign bank growth, as there is a significant negative relationship between home country economic growth and host country credit by greenfields. Finally, greenfield foreign banks’ credit growth is influenced by the health of the parent bank.

Are the less productive banks catching up to the more productive ones and, if so, how quickly and by what means? The objective of this study is to answer these questions by looking for convergence in productivity among bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US Past research has identified two major factors governing productivity in the banking sector – scale economies and X-efficiency. If the gains from scale economies decline with firm size and if the only difference between BHCs lies in their initial size, then the initially smaller BHCs should eventually catch up to the initially larger ones because the former tend to grow more quickly. However, the findings from this study do not support this hypothesis of “absolute convergence”. Indeed, the findings show strong evidence for “conditional convergence”, which means that the steady-state productivity to which a BHC is converging is conditional on the BHCs own level of X-efficiency. Conditional convergence implies that initial differences in X-efficiency among BHCs can, between them, create permanent differences in steady-state productivity.

It is often the case in default modeling that the need arises to calibrate a model to some prior probability of default. In many situations, a researcher may not know the true prior default rate for the population because the data set at hand is itself incomplete, either with respect to default identification (hidden defaults) or default under reporting. In situations where a researcher has access to two incomplete default data sets, for example in the case of two banks that have merged, it is possible to infer the number of “missing” defaults, which we demonstrate in this short note. We discuss an approach to estimating this quantity and show an example in which we infer the number of missing defaults in the combined legacy databases of the former Moody’s Risk Management Services and the former KMV Corporation. While calibration is one application of this approach, the method is a general one that can be applied in other settings as well.

The Sarbanes–Oxley (Sarbox) legislation aimed to reduce the opacity of financial statements and improve the integrity of financial reporting by enhancing corporate disclosure and governance practices. We estimate the valuation effects of Sarbox for firms in the financial services industry and find that, except for securities firms, these firms significantly benefited from its adoption. As hypothesized, these positive effects may be attributed to expected improvement in the transparency of the relatively opaque financial services firms. We find that the cross-sectional variation in the valuation effects can be explained by disclosure and governance characteristics. Several of the significant factors are supportive of a compliance cost hypothesis. In particular, we find that the effects were less favorable for firms with less independent audit committees, without a financial expert on the audit committee, with less financial statement footnote disclosures, with less involved CEOs, and if they were smaller. In addition, reflecting the value of stronger governance, more favorable effects occurred for firms with a greater degree of independence of the board and the board committees, when there is greater motivation and ability of board members to monitor the firm, and with a greater degree of institutional ownership. Lastly, we find the wealth effects of firms viewed as non-compliant are significantly lower than firms viewed as compliant, and the variation across the group of non-compliant firms is explained by disclosure and governance measures.

Several European Union countries have recently implemented or are envisaging fiscal operations which improve budgetary figures but have no structural impact on government finances. We evaluate some of these measures using a balance sheet approach. In particular, we examine the degree to which reductions in government debt in EU countries has been accompanied by a decumulation of government assets. In the runup to Maastricht we find a strong correlation between changes in government liabilities and government assets, and larger declines in government assets in countries starting from higher public debt levels.