We test the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of irrationality-induced financial anomalies by sorting securities on their individual residual variability as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk – a commonly asserted limit to arbitrage – and comparing the strength of anomalous returns in low versus high residual variability portfolios. We find no support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain undervaluation anomalies (small value stocks, value stocks generally, recent winners, and positive earnings surprises) but strong support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain overvaluation anomalies (small growth stocks, growth stocks generally, recent losers, and negative earnings surprises). Other tests also fail to support the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of overvaluation anomalies and suggest that at least some of the factor premiums for size, book-to-market, and momentum are unrelated to irrationality protected by limits to arbitrage

Limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens. Using a model with limits to arbitrage, where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance, we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean-reverting and volatile returns. Using data on hedge fund performance, we find robust support for these hypotheses: Funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals, and funds with performance-insensitive outflows, recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage

This study examines how limits of arbitrage can affect the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility. Using both unique trading constraints in the Chinese stock market and other commonly-used limits-of-arbitrage measures, we construct a comprehensive limits-of-arbitrage index. Based on this index, we find that the negative idiosyncratic volatility return premium is much stronger and more persistent in stocks with high limits of arbitrage. Furthermore, the existing explanations about the idiosyncratic volatility return premium cannot fully explain what we find about the role of limits of arbitrage in the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility in the Chinese stock market. Our study suggests that the trading constraints introduced in the name of protecting individual investors can actually hurt them, since these additional limits of arbitrage will increase the inefficiency of the security market

We propose a parsimonious, comprehensive proxy for innovations in limited arbitrage: innovations in ETFs’ premium. Consistent with a common component, we confirm limited arbitrage factors, LAFs, constructed from ETFs’ premium innovations spanning four asset classes are correlated. Further, we find that equity LAFs are negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Our pricing tests also confirm that LAFs provide pricing information beyond well-known limits of arbitrage: illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, our findings suggest that limited arbitrage risk is priced and LAF is a relevant risk-factor

A diversified portfolio of risk arbitrage positions produces an abnormal return of 0.6–0.9% per month over the period from 1981 to 1996. We trace these profits to practical limits on risk arbitrage. In our model of risk arbitrage, arbitrageurs’ risk-bearing capacity is constrained by deal completion risk and the size of the position they hold. Consistent with this model, we document that the returns to risk arbitrage increase in an ex ante measure of completion risk and target size. We also examine the influence of the general supply of arbitrage capital, measured by the total equity holdings of arbitrageurs, on arbitrage profits

We document the existence of a strategy designed to circumvent limits to arbitrage. Faced with short-sale constraints and noise trader risk, small arbitrageurs publicly reveal their information to induce the target’s shareholders (“the longs”) to sell, thereby accelerating price discovery. Using data for 124 short-sale campaigns in the United States between 2006 and 2011, we show that investors respond strongly to the information, with spikes in SEC filing views, volatility, order imbalances, realized spreads, turnover, and selling by the longs. Share prices fall by an aggregate $14.8 billion. Our findings imply that even extreme short-sale constraints need not constrain arbitrage

We examine 82 situations where the market value of a company is less than its subsidiary. These situations imply arbitrage opportunities, providing an ideal setting to study the risks and market frictions that prevent arbitrageurs from immediately forcing prices to fundamental values. For 30 percent of the sample, the link between the parent and its subsidiary is severed before the relative value discrepancy is corrected. Furthermore, returns to a specialized arbitrageur would be 50 percent larger if the path to convergence was smooth rather than as observed. Uncertainty about the distribution of returns and characteristics of the risks limits arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

Since October 2008, fixed rates for interest rate swaps with a 30-year maturity have been mostly below Treasury rates with the same maturity. Under standard assumptions, this implies the existence of arbitrage opportunities. This paper presents a model for pricing interest rate swaps, where frictions for holding bonds limit arbitrage. I analytically show that negative swap spreads should not be surprising. In the calibrated model, swap spreads can reasonably match empirical counterparts without the need for large demand imbalances in the swap market. Empirical evidence is consistent with the relation between term spreads and swap spreads in the model. Received April 16, 2017; editorial decision Januray 3, 2019 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices