The global ETF industry provides more complicated investment vehicles than low-cost index trackers. Instead, we find that the real investments of ETFs may deviate from their benchmarks to leverage informational advantages (which leads to a surprising stock-selection ability) and to help affiliated OEFs through cross-trading. These effects are more prevalent in ETFs domiciled in Europe. Moreover, ETF flows seem to respond to additional risk. These results have important normative implications for consumer protection and financial stability. Received March 18, 2017; Editorial decision October 14, 2018 by Editor Raman Uppal.

We construct a traded funding liquidity measure from stock returns. Guided by a model, we extract the measure as the return spread between two beta-neutral portfolios constructed using stocks with high and low margins, to control for their sensitivity to the aggregate funding shocks. Our measure of funding liquidity is correlated with other funding liquidity proxies. It delivers a positive risk premium that cannot be explained by existing risk factors. A model augmented by our funding liquidity measure has superior pricing performance for various portfolios. Despite evident comovement, this measure contains additional information that is not subsumed by market liquidity.

We investigate how and why relative tick sizes influence traders’ order strategies, and how this affects liquidity provision in the market. Using unique NYSE data, we find that a larger relative tick size benefits high-frequency trading (HFT) market makers: they leave orders in the book longer, trade more aggressively, and have higher profit margins. In a tick-constrained (tick-unconstrained) environment, larger relative ticks result in greater (less) depth, which is consistent with greater adverse selection coming from increased undercutting of limit orders by informed HFT market makers. Received October 12, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2018 by Editor Thierry Foucault.

We identify the causal effects of short-selling bans on stock prices using regression discontinuity (RD). We exploit three threshold-based rules that determine a stock’s short-selling eligibility on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Short-selling bans have a large effect on short-selling volume at all thresholds. Despite this, bans do not affect stock prices. Stock returns, volatility, and crash risk are not different for banned versus unrestricted stocks when appropriate counterfactual stocks are used to measure a ban’s effects. Our findings suggest that short-selling bans are not as costly as previously argued, but are ineffective at reducing volatility or buttressing prices. Received September 13, 2017; editorial decision April 29, 2018 by Editor Jeffrey Pontiff.

We study whether mutual funds systematically manage the downside risk of their portfolios in ways that improve their performance. We find that actively managed mutual funds on average possess positive downside-risk-timing ability. Managers adjust funds’ downside risk exposure in response to macroeconomic information; however, downside-risk-timing skills remain strong even after controlling for macro variables. Funds more skilled in timing downside risk outperform those that are not by 14.3 bp per month (or 1.73% annualized) unconditionally and by 39.9 bp per month (or 4.89% annualized) during recessions; they also attract larger flows. Received September 11, 2016; editorial decision Januaruy 08, 2018 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

Since the introduction of its quantitative and qualitative easing program in 2013, the Bank of Japan has been increasing its holdings of Japanese equity through large-scale purchases of index-linked ETFs, to lower risk premiums. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the supply shock to identify a positive and persistent impact on stock prices, consistent with a portfolio balance channel. The evidence suggests that long-run demand curves for stocks are downward sloping with unitary price elasticity. We show that the purchases of ETFs tracking the price-weighted Nikkei 225 generate pricing distortions relative to a value-weighted benchmark. Received April 13, 2018; editorial decision July 18, 2019 by Editor Thierry Foucault.

We consider a model of external financing in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality of their projects and seek funds from competitive financiers. The literature restricts attention to monotonic, or “manipulation proof,” securities and finds that straight debt is the uniquely optimal contract. Monotonicity is commonly justified by the argument that it would endogenously arise if the entrepreneur can window dress the realized earnings before contract maturity. We explicitly characterize the optimal contracts when entrepreneurs engage in window dressing and/or output diversion and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for straight debt to be optimal. Contrary to conventional wisdom, debt is often suboptimal, and it is never uniquely optimal. Optimal contracts are nonmonotonic and induce profit manipulation in equilibrium. They can be implemented as performance-sensitive debt. Received: March 24, 2018; Editorial decision September 22, 2018 Editor: Uday Rajan

We examine how performance changes at airlines in response to a change in executive incentives. Airlines with executive bonuses contingent on on-time arrival do improve on-time performance. We find evidence of strategic gaming of the incentive as some carriers increase scheduled flight times, making it easier for flights to arrive on time. This effect is more pronounced for competitive routes. Carriers also do not decrease the frequency of flights or the number of passengers to make it easier to be on time, but they do slightly decrease fares. Competitors on the same routes also improve their on-time performance, even when their executive bonuses are not contingent on on-time performance, consistent with competition in strategic complements. (JEL G30, G34, G32) Received February 5, 2018; editorial decision April 3, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Among U.S. public firms, technological innovation is concentrated on a small set of large players, with innovation “leaders” having considerably lower systematic risk than “laggards.” To understand this fact, we build a winner-takes-all patent race model and show that a firm’s expected return decreases in its innovation output and increases in that of its rivals. Using a comprehensive firm-level panel of information on patenting activity by fields of technology in 1950–2010, we find strong support for the model’s predictions. Our results highlight that strategic interactions among firms competing in innovation are an important determinant of risk and expected returns. (JEL G12, G31) Received August 6, 2018; editorial decision October 19, 2019 by Andrew Ellul.

We consider a dynamic model of investment in which a firm can hold inventory to mitigate the price risk of an input commodity. Our model predicts that inventory hedges against net worth risk by smoothing investment in capital, regardless of the level of current net worth. Savings enhance the operational hedge offered by inventory, because they better conserve net worth when the commodity price is low. These predictions are confirmed in a sample of U.S. manufacturing corporations. We find that the empirical sensitivity of inventory investment to price changes is positive for any level of firms’ net worth. Savings and inventory are both positively related to financing constraints and cash-flow risk, but investment is more sensitive to inventory. Received November 13, 2017, Editorial decision September 25, 2018 by Editor Uday Rajan.