I empirically examine the factors that determine whether firms use bank lines of credit or cash in corporate liquidity management. I find that bank lines of credit, also known as revolving credit facilities, are a viable liquidity substitute only for firms that maintain high cash flow. In contrast, firms with low cash flow are less likely to obtain a line of credit, and they rely more heavily on cash in their corporate liquidity management. An important channel for this correlation is the use of cash flow-based financial covenants by banks that supply credit lines. I find that firms must maintain high cash flow to remain compliant with covenants, and banks restrict firm access to credit facilities in response to covenant violations. Using the cash-flow sensitivity of cash as a measure of financial constraints, I provide evidence that lack of access to a line of credit is a more statistically powerful measure of financial constraints than traditional measures used in the literature. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

I examine the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings by Moody's and Standard & Poor's in 1995 to evaluate whether third-party rating agencies affect firm financial and investment policy. The introduction of bank loan ratings leads to an increase in the use of debt by firms that obtain a rating, and also increases in firms' asset growth, cash acquisitions, and investment in working capital. Consistent with a causal effect of the ratings, the increase in debt usage and investment is concentrated in the set of borrowers who are of lower credit quality and do not have an issuer credit rating before 1995. A loan-level analysis demonstrates that previously unrated borrowers who obtain a loan rating gain increased access to the capital of less-informed investors. The results suggest that third-party debt certification has real effects on firm investment policy. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Better measurement of the output produced and capital employed by firms substantially improves the ability to explain capital structure variation in the cross section. For every firm, we construct the set of other firms producing the same output using the set of product market competitors listed in the firm’s public Securities and Exchange Commission filings. In addition, we improve measurement of capital structure by explicitly accounting for leased capital. These two steps increase the explanatory power of the average capital structure of other firms producing similar output on a firm’s capital structure by 50% compared to using only the average unadjusted debt ratio of other firms in the same three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We provide evidence that the large explanatory power of the capital structure of other firms producing similar output is related to the assets used in the production process. Our findings suggest that what a firm produces and the assets used in production are the most important determinants of capital structure in the cross section.

We evaluate the impact of the 2009 Cash for Clunkers program on short- and medium-run auto purchases. Our empirical strategy exploits variation across U.S. cities in ex ante exposure to the program as measured by the number of “clunkers” in the city as of summer 2008. We find that the program induced the purchase of an additional 370,000 cars in July and August 2009. However, we find strong evidence of reversal; high clunker counties bought fewer autos in the 10 months after the program expired, which offset most of the initial purchases. We find no evidence of an effect on employment, house prices, or household default rates in cities with higher exposure to the program.

We conduct a within-county analysis using detailed ZIP code—level data to document new findings regarding the origins of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The sharp increase in mortgage defaults in 2007 is significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes, or ZIP codes with a disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers as of 1996. Prior to the default crisis, these subprime ZIP codes experience an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit. The expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime ZIP codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the past eighteen years in which income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. We show that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime ZIP codes and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages.

We show that deterioration in household balance sheets, or the housing net worth channel, played a significant role in the sharp decline in U.S. employment between 2007 and 2009. Counties with a larger decline in housing net worth experience a larger decline in non-tradable employment. This result is not driven by industry-specific supply-side shocks, exposure to the construction sector, policy-induced business uncertainty, or contemporaneous credit supply tightening. We find little evidence of labor market adjustment in response to the housing net worth shock. There is no significant expansion of the tradable sector in counties with the largest decline in housing net worth. Further, there is little evidence of wage adjustment within or emigration out of the hardest hit counties.

Borrowing against the increase in home equity by existing homeowners was responsible for a significant fraction of the rise in US household leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in defaults from 2006 to 2008. Instrumental variables estimation shows that homeowners extracted 25 cents for every dollar increase in home equity. Home equity–based borrowing was stronger for younger households and households with low credit scores. The evidence suggests that borrowed funds were used for real outlays. Home equity–based borrowing added $1.25 trillion in household debt from 2002 to 2008, and accounts for at least 39 percent of new defaults from 2006 to 2008. JEL: D14, R31

Crises and sharp economic downturns, while undesirable, provide economists with a unique opportunity to test and hone economic theory. Indeed, some of the most influential advance ments in economic thought, including Milton Friedman’s monetarist tradition, John Maynard Keynes’ fiscal theory, and Irving Fisher’s debtdeflation hypothesis, emerged from analysis of the Great Depression. The current economic malaise, which we refer to as “The Great Recession,” provides another watershed moment to reevaluate our core economic beliefs. However, in contrast to our peers in previous crises, we are fortunate to have access to large-scale microeconomic datasets and advancements in computational capacity. These advantages allow for a more rigorous analysis of the current recession and therefore a more informed understanding of its origins, propagation, and consequences. Our purpose is to highlight how a micro-level analysis of the Great Recession provides us with important clues to understand the origins of the crisis, the link between credit and asset prices, the feedback effect from asset prices to the real economy, and the role of household leverage in explaining the downturn. We hope that our discussion also serves as an example of the useful ness of incorporating microeconomic data and techniques in answering traditional macroeco nomic questions. I. What Were the Origins of the Credit Cycle: Credit Demand or Credit Supply?

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.

We propose a theory of indebted demand, capturing the idea that large debt burdens lower aggregate demand, and thus the natural rate of interest. At the core of the theory is the simple yet underappreciated observation that borrowers and savers differ in their marginal propensities to save out of permanent income. Embedding this insight in a two-agent perpetual-youth model, we find that recent trends in income inequality and financial deregulation lead to indebted household demand, pushing down the natural rate of interest. Moreover, popular expansionary policies—such as accommodative monetary policy—generate a debt-financed short-run boom at the expense of indebted demand in the future. When demand is sufficiently indebted, the economy gets stuck in a debt-driven liquidity trap, or debt trap. Escaping a debt trap requires consideration of less conventional macroeconomic policies, such as those focused on redistribution or those reducing the structural sources of high inequality.