The paper presents an empirical analysis of the alleged transformation of the financial systems in the three major European economies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Based on a unified data set developed on the basis of national accounts statistics, and employing a new and consistent method of measurement, the following question is addressed: Is there a general trend toward disintermediation, with banks losing importance to the markets, that is causing these three financial systems to converge? We find that there is neither a general trend toward disintermediation, nor toward a transformation from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, nor toward a loss of importance of banks. Only in the case of France could strong signs of transformation as well as signs of a general decline in the role of banks be found. Thus the three financial systems also do not seem to be converging. However, there is also a common pattern of change: the intermediation chains are lengthening in all three countries. Nonbank financial intermediaries are taking over a more important role as mobilizers of capital from the nonfinancial sectors. In combination with the trend toward securitization of bank liabilities, this change increases the funding costs of banks and may put banks under pressure. In the case of France, this change is so pronounced that it might even threaten the stability of the financial system. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21 and G23.

We use panel data from nine countries over the period 1996–2008 to test how revenue diversification affects bank value. Relying on a comprehensive framework for bank performance measurement, we find robust evidence against a conglomerate discount, unlike studies concerned with industrial firms. Rather, diversification increases bank profitability and, as a consequence also market valuations. This indirect performance effect does not depend on whether diversification was achieved through organic growth or through M&A activity. We further demonstrate that previous results in the literature on the impact of diversification on bank value presumably differ due to the way diversification is measured, and the negligence of the indirect value effect via bank profitability. Our evidence against a conglomerate discount in banking remains robust also during the sub-prime crisis.

Cryptocurrencies have received growing attention from individuals, the media, and regulators. However, little is known about the investors whom these financial instruments attract. Using administrative data, we describe the investment behavior of individuals who invest in cryptocurrencies with structured retail products. We find that cryptocurrency investors are active traders who are prone to investment biases and hold risky portfolios. Cryptocurrency investors are more likely to invest in stocks with high media sentiment and more likely to employ heuristics from technical analysis. In line with attention effects and anticipatory utility, we find that the average cryptocurrency investor substantially increases account logins and trading activity after his or her first cryptocurrency purchase. Furthermore, cryptocurrency investors tend to tilt their portfolios toward even more risky securities after cryptocurrency adoption. Our results document which investors are more likely to adopt new financial products and help inform regulators about investors’ vulnerability to cryptocurrency investments.

We study the conflict of interest that arises when a universal bank conducts proprietary trading alongside its retail banking services. Our data set contains the stock holdings of every German bank and those of their corresponding retail clients. We investigate (i) whether banks sell stocks from their proprietary portfolios to their retail customers, (ii) whether those stocks subsequently underperform, and (iii) whether retail customers of banks engaging in proprietary trading earn lower portfolio returns than their peers. We present affirmative evidence for all three questions and conclude that proprietary trading can, in fact, be detrimental to retail investors.

We educate investors about the benefits of dividend reinvestment and costs of misperceiving dividends as free income. The intervention increases planned dividend reinvestment in survey responses. Using trading records, we observe a causal increase in dividend reinvestment in the field of roughly 50 cents for every euro received. This holds relative to investors’ prior behavior and various control samples. Investors who learned the most from the intervention update their trading the most. The results suggest the free dividends fallacy is a significant source of dividend demand. Our study demonstrates that simple, targeted, and focused educational interventions can affect investment behavior.

Using data from a large German brokerage, we find that individuals investing in passive exchange-traded funds (ETFs) do not improve their portfolio performance, even before transaction costs. Further analysis suggests that this is because of poor ETF timing as well as poor ETF selection (relative to the choice of low-cost, well-diversified ETFs). An exploration of investor heterogeneity shows that though investors who trade more have worse ETF timing, no groups of investors benefit by using ETFs, and no groups will lose by investing in low-cost, well-diversified ETFs.

We use two data sets, one from a large brokerage and another from a major bank, to ask: (i) whether financial advisors are more likely to be matched with poorer, uninformed investors or with richer and experienced investors; (ii) how advised accounts actually perform relative to self-managed accounts; (iii) whether the contribution of independent and bank advisors is similar. We find that advised accounts offer on average lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). Trading costs contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with commissions being the main source of advisor income. Results are robust to controlling for investor and local area characteristics. The results apply with stronger force to bank advisors than to independent financial advisors, consistent with greater limitations on bank advisory services.

Based on data gathered from 27,000 real-world meetings between financial advisors and clients of a large German bank, we show that advisors offer more self-serving advice to women, while men are more likely to receive sales fee rebates and less likely to be recommended expensive in-house multi-asset (IHMA) funds. Additional client and advisor surveys provide evidence consistent with statistical discrimination based on gender as a proxy for client financial sophistication, with female clients exhibiting lower financial literacy, confidence, and price sensitivity. Moreover, female advisors report less confidence in their own professional skills and engage in less discrimination than male colleagues.

Working with one of the largest brokerages in Germany, we record what happens when unbiased investment advice is offered to a random set of approximately 8,000 active retail customers out of the brokerage's several hundred thousand retail customers. We find that investors who most need the financial advice are least likely to obtain it. The investors who do obtain the advice (about 5%), however, hardly follow the advice and do not improve their portfolio efficiency by much. Overall, our results imply that the mere availability of unbiased financial advice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for benefiting retail investors.