I document the profits on a trade that is long the old 30-year Treasury bond and short the new 30-year Treasury bond, and is rolled over every auction cycle from June 1995 to November 1999. Despite the systematic convergence of the spread over the auction cycle, the average profits are close to zero. The difference in repo-market financing rates between the two bonds is a significant cost of carry in this trade. I show that variation in the bond/old-bond spread is driven by the Treasury supply of 30-year bonds as well as aggregate factors affecting investors’ preference for liquid assets.

We present a theory in which the key driver of short-term debt issued by the financial sector is the portfolio demand for safe and liquid assets by the nonfinancial sector. This demand drives a premium on safe and liquid assets that the financial sector exploits by owning risky and illiquid assets and writing safe and liquid claims against them. The central prediction of the theory is that safe and liquid government debt should crowd out financial sector lending financed by short-term debt. We verify this prediction with US data from 1875 to 2014. We take a series of approaches to rule out standard crowding out via real interest rates and to address potential endogeneity concerns.

We develop a model of financial crises with both a financial amplification mechanism, via frictional intermediation, and a role for sentiment, via time-varying beliefs about an illiquidity state. The model accounts for the entire crisis cycle, matching data on the frothy precrisis behavior of asset markets and credit; the sharp transition to a crisis where asset values fall, disintermediation occurs, and output falls; and the slow postcrisis recovery in output. Both the intermediation and the belief mechanism are essential to match the crisis cycle. However, modeling the belief variation via either a Bayesian or a diagnostic model can match the broad patterns.

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a “fresh start” after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy—namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances—support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.

Abstract Bank-created money, shadow-bank money, and Treasury bonds all satisfy investors’ demand for liquidity. We measure the quantity of these forms of liquidity and their corresponding liquidity premium in a sample from 1934 to 2016, estimating the substitutability of these assets and the liquidity per unit delivered by each asset. Treasuries and bank transaction deposits are imperfect substitutes, in contrast to perfect substitutes found by Nagel (2016). Bank and nonbank non-transaction deposits are closer substitutes for Treasuries. Our empirical results inform theories of the monetary transmission mechanism running through shifts in asset supplies and models of the coexistence of the shadow banking and regulated banking system. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We develop a model of the global financial cycle with one key ingredient: the international demand for safe dollar assets. The model matches patterns of dollar borrowing and currency mismatch, the U.S. external balance sheet, exorbitant privilege, spillovers of the U.S. monetary policy to the rest of the world, and the dollar as a global risk factor. In doing so, we lay out a novel transmission mechanism through which the U.S. monetary policy affects the currency market and the global economy. The global financial cycle is a dollar cycle.

We model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary. Intermediaries face an equity capital constraint. Risk premia rise when the constraint binds, reflecting the capital scarcity. The calibrated model matches the nonlinearity of risk premia during crises and the speed of reversion in risk premia from a crisis back to precrisis levels. We evaluate the effect of three government policies: reducing intermediaries borrowing costs, injecting equity capital, and purchasing distressed assets. Injecting equity capital is particularly effective because it alleviates the equity capital constraint that drives the model's crisis. (JEL E44, G12, G21, G23, G24)

ABSTRACT How can mortgages be redesigned to reduce macrovolatility and default? We address this question using a quantitative equilibrium life‐cycle model. Designs with countercyclical payments outperform fixed payments. Among those, designs that front‐load payment reductions in recessions outperform those that spread relief over the full term. Front‐loading alleviates liquidity constraints when they bind most, reducing default and stimulating housing demand. To illustrate, a fixed‐rate mortgage (FRM) with an option to convert to adjustable‐rate mortgage, which front‐loads payment reductions relative to an FRM with an option to refinance underwater, reduces price and consumption declines six times as much and default three times as much.

The United States is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate “bubble” and amplified by the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector. Conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result of mistakes in regulatory policy: an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period of the bubble, and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders. In this paper we argue that, while correct in some dimensions, this story misses two key structural factors behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding lever age. First, over the last decade, the US has experienced large and sustained capital inflows from foreigners seeking US assets to store value (Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas 2008 ). Second, especially after the NASDAQ/tech bubble and bust, excess world savings have looked predominantly for safe debt investments. This should not be surprising because a large amount of the capital flow into the US has been from foreign central banks and governments that are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value (Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgenson 2008). In this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment. The model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current crisis. First, during a period of good shocks— which we interpret as the period up to the end