This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise. We implement this test using a data set that covers the diffusion of twenty technologies for 23 countries over the past two centuries. We find that each of the relevant institutional variables that affect the costs of erecting barriers has a significantly larger effect on the diffusion of technologies with a competing predecessor technology than when no such technology exists. These effects are quantitatively important. Thus, we conclude that lobbies are an important barrier to technology adoption and to development.

We develop a model that, at the aggregate level, is similar to the one-sector neoclassical growth model; at the disaggregate level, it has implications for the path of observable measures of technology adoption. We estimate it using data on the diffusion of 15 technologies in 166 countries over the last two centuries. Our results reveal that, on average, countries have adopted technologies 45 years after their invention. There is substantial variation across technologies and countries. Newer technologies have been adopted faster than old ones. The cross-country variation in the adoption of technologies accounts for at least 25 percent of per capita income differences.

Why did the stock market decline so much in the early 1970's and remain low until the early 1980's? We argue that it was because information technology arrived on the scene and the stock-market incumbents of the day were not ready to implement it. Instead, new firms would bring in the new technology after the mid-1980's. Investors foresaw this in the early 1970's and stock prices fell right away. In our model, new capital destroys old capital, but with a lag. The prospect of this causes the value of the old capital to fall right away.

Aggregate real wages exhibit less procyclicality than most macroeconomic models predict. We use 35 years of Current Population Survey data to confirm that the puzzling behavior of wages largely owes to changes in the composition of the employed over the business cycle. This composition effect relates to changes in both the number and the relative wage levels of those entering and exiting. The changing gap in wages of entrants and exiters is especially important for the unemployed. A large part of this wage gap is due to differences in average Mincer residuals between entrants and exiters.

Restaurant prices in the euro area increased dramatically after the introduction of the euro. We show that this increase can be explained by a common menu cost model, extended to include a state-dependent decision of firms on when to adopt the new currency. Two mechanisms drive this result. First, firms concentrate otherwise staggered price increases around the changeover. Second, before the adoption of the euro, prices do not reflect the marginal cost increases expected to occur after the changeover. This “horizon effect” disappears as soon as the new currency is adopted, causing a jump in the optimal price.