This study investigates whether tax-based proprietary costs associated with being a public firm (i.e., costs resulting from increased visibility to the tax authority) discourage public listing. I exploit the introduction of a mandatory disclosure requirement (FIN 48) which generated a signal to the government regarding the uncertainty of public firms’ tax positions, allowing for more carefully targeted audits. I hypothesize and find evidence of an increased propensity to go private by public, tax aggressive firms following the enactment of the disclosure rule but prior to its adoption. Cross-sectionally, the effect is stronger among firms that are more sensitive to tax-based proprietary costs. Moreover, IPOs by tax aggressive firms exhibit a relative decline after FIN 48, consistent with the disclosure requirement deterring private, tax aggressive firms from going public. Overall, my findings suggest that mandatory disclosure rules imposing tax-based proprietary costs may discourage some firms from operating as public entities.

This study examines the effect of corporate tax enforcement on managerial self-dealing, with a focus on manipulated gifts of insider stock. Prior work suggests that managers employ a variety of manipulative techniques to maximize their personal tax benefits from donating corporate stock, such as strategically timing gifts based on private information and fraudulently backdating gifts to the date with the highest price. Building on prior literature suggesting that the tax authority can discipline managerial misconduct, we hypothesize that IRS scrutiny from a corporate tax audit raises managers' perceived risk of detection, who refrain from making manipulated stock gifts while the firm is under audit. Using a novel, firm-specific measure to identify firms under audit, we find direct evidence that heightened scrutiny from tax enforcement serves as an effective monitoring mechanism and reduces managers' self-dealing behavior.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether managers internalize the spillover effects of their disclosure on the stock price of related firms and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on firm‐initiated disclosures during all‐cash acquisitions, we find evidence consistent with acquirers strategically generating news that they expect will depress the target's stock price. Our results suggest the disclosure strategy leads to lower target returns during the negotiation period when the takeover price is being determined and results in a lower target premium. These findings are robust to a battery of specifications and falsification tests. Our results are consistent with expected spillovers influencing the timing and content of firms’ disclosures in M&A transactions.

We study the role of litigation risk in M&A valuations. Specifically, we hypothesize that litigation risk leads to strategic valuations in fairness opinions (FOs) obtained in M&A transactions. Employing a regulatory shock to merger litigation risk and focusing on the most common valuation techniques – peer firm comparables and DCF analysis – we find that target-sought FOs exhibit lower valuations when litigation risk is high. The effect is concentrated in deals with greater agency conflicts between target management and outside shareholders. Furthermore, downward-biased valuations reduce appraisal litigation but are also associated with lower premiums. In contrast to prior work suggesting that target-sought FOs are used to negotiate a higher takeover price, our findings imply that they are used, at least in part, to mitigate litigation risk and facilitate successful deal completion. Our findings are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators interested in M&A price formation, and highlight the role litigation plays therein.