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A Non‐Bayesian Theory of State‐Dependent Utility

Econometrica 2019 87(4), 1341-1366
Many decision situations involve two or more of the following divergences from subjective expected utility: imprecision of beliefs (or ambiguity), imprecision of tastes (or multi‐utility), and state dependence of utility. This paper proposes and characterizes a model of uncertainty averse preferences that can simultaneously incorporate all three phenomena. The representation supports a principled separation of (imprecise) beliefs and (potentially state‐dependent, imprecise) tastes. Moreover, the representation permits comparative statics separating the roles of beliefs and tastes, and is modular: it easily delivers special cases involving various combinations of the phenomena, as well as state‐dependent multi‐utility generalizations covering popular ambiguity models.

Time to Retire? The Effect of State Fiscal Policies on Retirement Decisions

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 35-39
Our research addresses the importance of state fiscal policies on the probability of retirement using a panel of individual tax return data. Results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the income or sales tax rate reduces the probability of retirement by about 8.7 percent. The evidence suggests that state spending might also affect retirement decisions but magnitudes are inconclusive. In general, the results suggest that the income effect dominates; that is, higher tax rates at the state-level reduce disposable income and decrease the probability of retiring. Results are similar in models examining single and married filers separately.

Robust Social Decisions

American Economic Review 2016 106(9), 2407-2425
We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so, we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.