We investigate if prior professional legal education either restrains or increases the extent to which the insider trades of company executives and directors are informed. We show that executives and directors with legal expertise (lawyer-insiders) earn significantly lower abnormal returns than non-lawyer-insiders when they purchase their own company's shares. Purchases by lawyer-insiders are associated with lower future earnings surprises and firm profitability than those made by non-lawyer-insiders, and are more muted following months with high levels of SEC enforcement activity. Our results suggest that insiders with legal education may be more conservative in exploiting private information when making insider trades.

A higher frequency of positive overnight returns followed by negative trading day reversals during a month suggests a more intense daily tug of war between opposing investor clienteles, who are likely composed of noise traders overnight and arbitrageurs during the day. We show that a more intense daily tug of war predicts higher future returns in the cross section. Additional tests support the conclusion that, in a more intense tug of war, daytime arbitrageurs are more likely to discount the possibility that positive news arrives overnight and thus overcorrect the persistent upward overnight price pressure.

This study shows that the recent trajectory of a firm's profits predicts future profitability and stock returns. The predictive information contained in the trend of profitability is not subsumed by the level of profitability, earnings momentum, or other well-known determinants of stock returns. The profit trend also predicts the earnings surprise one quarter later, and analyst forecast errors over the following 12 months, suggesting that sophisticated investors underreact to the information in the profit trend. On the other hand, we find no evidence of investor overreaction, and our results cannot be explained by well-known risk factors.

We examine the relation between insiders’ investment horizon and the information content of their trades with respect to future stock returns. We conjecture that an insider's investment horizon establishes a benchmark for expected patterns of continued trading behavior and thus helps identify unexpected insider trades, which should be more informative in efficient markets. Consistent with this conjecture, the trades of short‐horizon insiders are both more unexpected and more informed, on average, than those of long‐horizon insiders. Short‐horizon insiders and their firms also tend to display characteristics that are associated with a greater focus on short‐termism.