This study examines the impact of venture capitalists' (VC) political connections on their portfolio companies. Specifically, we use a manually-collected dataset of VCs' political connection to investigate the potential benefits and costs that politically-connected VCs bring to their portfolio companies. On the benefit side, we find that companies backed by politically-connected VCs are more likely to obtain IPO approval from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, China's counterpart to the SEC in the US). On the other hand, these VCs are more likely to acquire equity in the company at a significant discount and to invest shortly before the IPO application. In addition, we find that politically-connected VC-backed companies do not experience greater improvements in financial performance, corporate governance, or innovation output subsequent to receiving venture financing. Our results further show that companies backed by VCs with political connections are less mature and experience more underpricing at their IPO than non-politically-connected VC-backed companies. Finally, we find that, compared to non-politically-connected VCs, politically-connected VCs exit earlier after a company's IPO and that their portfolio companies experience greater post-IPO underperformance and performance volatility.

How does trust affect business contracting at the firm level? We analyze the case of foreign high-tech companies investing in China, where the risk of expropriation of their intellectual property is high. We find that firms mitigate this type of risk by taking local trustworthiness into account when making investment decisions. Firms prefer to invest in regions where local partners and employees are considered more trustworthy; they are also more likely to establish joint ventures and to make greater research and development investments. We employ instrumental variable regressions and dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimators to alleviate endogeneity concerns and control for time-invariant heterogeneity.

Using a unique and rich database of high-technology firms in China, we show that effective enforcement of intellectual property rights at the provincial level is critical in encouraging financing and investing in R&D. Better enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights positively affects firms' ability to acquire new external debt and allows firms to invest in more R&D, generate more innovation patents, and produce more sales from new products. Our results suggest that facilitating financing and investing in R&D are the channels through which better IP rights enforcement can affect economic growth.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms’ incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs. Received June 17, 2015; editorial decision November 23, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We analyze the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in transforming the management and governance of China's private family firms. We show, causally, that VC-backed family firms are more likely than non-VC backed family firms to experience departures of family members from top management positions and decreases in the separation between family control rights and cash-flow rights; these effects are stronger when VCs have greater equity ownership or board representation. We show that these changes in top management and governance in family firms are associated with higher IPO firm valuations and better post-IPO long run stock returns.

We examine whether social media criticisms posted by small investors can predict subsequent firm acquisition decisions. Specifically, we use textual analysis to examine the internet stock message board postings of 303 value-reducing acquisition attempts. Our empirical evidence shows that small investors' negative postings are able to predict a potential acquirer's subsequent decision to withdraw its attempt. We further find that this predictive ability increases with the information quality of postings, and that the predictive information extracted from social media is incremental to that captured by proposal announcement returns, conventional media coverage, analyst reports, and institutional investors' responses related to the proposed acquisition. Finally, we show that message board criticisms are also able to predict governance outcomes beyond acquisition decisions. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that social media play a role in corporate governance by gathering crowd wisdom and uncovering additional value-relevant information.