Does the structure of financial systems influence the employment respo0nse to adverse shocks? Using (a) county-industry employment data differentiated by firm size and (b) high-frequency county employment data differentiated by income, we find that employment at small firms, employment of low-income workers, and overall employment fell less in counties with higher proportions of small banks in response to the pandemic. Furthermore, small banks lend more to small businesses than large banks, above and beyond government-guaranteed PPP loans. Evidence suggests that small banks cushioned small firms and low-income workers from the adverse effects of the pandemic.

We study how involving employee board representatives in determining managerial compensation affects the within-firm pay ratio. The 2009 German Compensation Act shifted executive pay decisions to the entire supervisory board, amplifying employees’ influence at firms with parity employee representation. This reform resulted in increased manager-to-worker pay ratios, driven by higher managerial compensation, without corresponding changes in firm performance or manager turnover. The result is robust in matched samples and absent in falsification tests. Improved employee job security and weak wage increases point to a possible alliance between employees and managers, indicating shared governance may not necessarily reduce pay inequality.

We evaluate how a positive, technology-driven shock to bank liquidity affects small business dynamics across different size distributions. We first show that banks receiving positive liquidity shocks increase lending to relatively larger SMEs, not to the smallest firms. This finding is consistent with the view that a positive liquidity shock enhances bank charter values, thereby reducing risk-taking incentives. Moreover, such disproportionate credit allocation leads to a crowding-out effect on micro firms. When larger SMEs grow faster and exit less because of better access to credit, their expansion stifles the development of micro firms, whose access to credit remains unchanged.

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

Using a unique proprietary account-level trading dataset in China, we investigate how active information acquisition alleviates price-based return comovement, a typical anomaly in stock splits. We find that: 1) individual trading drives the comovement and the trading correlation between split stocks and the low-price portfolio increases significantly after splits; 2) individuals can learn the firm fundamentals through information acquisition, which effectively alleviates their categorized bias; and 3) the role of information acquisition is more significant in environments characterized by greater uncertainty. Our results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. Taken together, this paper emphasizes the important role of information acquisition in alleviating behavioral bias and improving decision-making.

This paper considers a property law enactment that gave creditors more rights over the assets underlying their secured loans to private firms and gave private firms more protections against the potential expropriation of their assets. We find that this property law enactment led to a significant increase in firm value. We also find that the law׳s impact on value was more profound for firms with more tangible assets, lower internal cash flows, and stronger growth opportunities, and less profound for politically connected firms. Taken together, our findings confirm the importance of property rights protection in enhancing firm value.

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.

Mandatory audit partner rotation has been adopted in certain countries while audit firm rotation is still being debated in many places. Most of the extant research on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality provides evidence at the audit firm level. However, since audit firm tenure is correlated with partner tenure and audit firm rotation is more costly than partner rotation, it is important to know whether earnings quality is related to audit firm tenure, partner tenure, or both. We investigate this issue using a sample of Taiwanese companies for which the audit report must be signed by two partners with their names disclosed in the report. Using performance adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality, we find that the absolute and positive values of discretionary accruals decrease significantly with partner tenure. After controlling for partner tenure, we find that absolute discretionary accruals decrease significantly with audit firm tenure. Our findings are not consistent with the arguments that earnings quality decreases with extended audit partner tenure and that audit firm rotation in addition to partner rotation would improve earnings quality. Our results are robust to alternative ways of measuring partner tenure under the dual signature system. However, since the audit reports do not disclose which partner is responsible for maintaining the auditor-client relationship, measurement errors in partner tenure remain an issue that cannot be fully addressed in the context of our study.