We analyze a firm's investment problem when it faces preemption risk and profits are convex in market profitability. In a setup where firms have asymmetric profit convexity, which we relate to firm quality, we show that this has interesting effects on valuation and the order of entry. The interplay between profit convexity and market growth impacts whether a high-quality or a low-quality firm is the first mover. We relate the first-mover advantage to patents; we find that patents expedite investments and increase the incentives for high-quality firms to become first movers. Furthermore, even with a persistent first-mover advantage we show that first-mover advantages in terms of firm value are either over- or underestimated. Thus, our model sheds light on why empirical studies find mixed support for the existence of a first-mover advantage.

We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated enterprises, and we emphasize the importance of information and the venture capitalist's role in resolving adverse selection on the entrepreneurial side. The importance of information increases the minimum carried interest offered to the venture capitalist, whereas correlated projects decrease it. The carried interest is determined by the size and level of correlation in his portfolio. Our analysis provides predictions in line with a number of empirical observations, e.g. that venture capitalists typically receive a carried interest which is “sticky” around a 20% level.

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.

We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.