Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark‐ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities' activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input‐output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.

We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines standard debt, which induces liquidation and provides strong incentives, and bail-in debt, which restores solvency but provides weaker incentives. Given fire sales, an optimal policy response entails joint regulation: a bail-in regime reduces standard debt while leverage regulation reduces total debt. Bail-ins replace bailouts as a recapitalization tool.

We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National governments setting quantity regulations noncooperatively fail to achieve the globally efficient outcome, underregulating domestic banks and overregulating foreign banks. Surprisingly, noncooperative national governments using revenue-generating Pigouvian taxation can achieve the global optimum. Intuitively, this occurs because governments internalize the business value of foreign banks through the tax revenue collected. Our theory provides a unified framework to think about international bank regulations and yields concrete insights with the potential to improve on the current policy stance.

Should central banks’ inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government and a central bank. The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank’s reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust the target’s level and flexibility one period in advance. A declining natural interest rate and a flattening Phillips curve imply opposite optimal target adjustments. Our results speak to practical policy questions of inflation target design.

We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral‐constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire‐sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance–sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies between insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recognition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing its bond market by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalizes China’s strategy as trying to build credibility as a safe issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We use our framework to shed light on China’s response to episodes of capital outflows.

We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1−β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.