We examine the effects of structural change in the U.S. banking industry, as well as key regulatory changes, including recently enacted deposit insurance reform legislation, on the resiliency of the FDIC-administered bank insurance fund (BIF) by estimating and comparing the probability of BIF insolvency over time. We do this using a Markov-switching model that relies on historical patterns of BIF disbursements to define the probability of switching among three “states” of the banking industry's financial health. Monte Carlo simulations are then performed to project the financial condition of the BIF over a 50-year period. Our results indicate that the insolvency risk to the bank insurance fund has increased significantly due to industry consolidation, and is mainly due to the concentration of deposits in the 10 largest U.S. banking companies. We also find that recent deposit insurance reforms will cause only a marginal reduction in the risk of BIF insolvency. The increased risk associated with a more concentrated industry structure simply dominates the reform effect.

This paper examines how the US financial crisis of 1893 affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930. The results indicate that a 1% increase in bank instability reduced output growth by 2–5%. A comparison of Nebraska, which had one of the highest bank failure rates, with West Virginia, which did not experience a single bank failure, reveals that disintermediation affected growth through a portfolio change among savers: people simply stopped trusting banks. Time series evidence from newspapers indicates that articles containing the words “money hidden” significantly increase after banking crises, then slowly die out.

This paper establishes liquidity linkage between stock and Treasury bond markets. There is a lead-lag relationship between illiquidity of the two markets and bidirectional Granger causality. The effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity is consistent with flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity episodes. Monetary policy impacts illiquidity. The evidence indicates that bond illiquidity acts as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred into the stock market. These effects are observed across illiquidity of bonds of different maturities and are especially pronounced for illiquidity of short-term maturities. The paper provides evidence of illiquidity integration between stock and bond markets.

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.

We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions. We find that while stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions, there is surprisingly no discernible influence of stock options. Our analysis supports the view that private benefits derived by managers are increasing in internal capital misallocation. We also document a strong positive link between CEO incentive compensation and excess value of diversified firms suggesting that the diversification discount can be ameliorated with CEO incentive compensation. The study contributes to the ICM literature and the literature on conglomerate diversification discount.

We examine CEOs' risk of termination, its determinants and its effect on firm value. Using survival analysis, we find that the risk of termination increases for about thirteen years before decreasing slightly with CEO tenure; 82% of CEOs have tenure of less than thirteen years. We also find that tenure increases with performance and compensation and decreases with monitoring by the board. Changes in the risk of termination do not have a significant effect on firm value. Taken as a whole, our results are consistent with the view that corporate governance functions reasonably well for the vast majority of firms.

Empirical research on cities starts with a spatial equilibrium condition: workers and firms are assumed to be indifferent across space. This condition implies that research on cities is different from research on countries, and that work on places within countries needs to consider population, income, and housing prices simultaneously. Housing supply elasticity will determine whether urban success reveals itself in the form of more people or higher incomes. Urban economists generally accept the existence of agglomeration economies, which exist when productivity rises with density, but estimating the magnitude of those economies is difficult. Some manufacturing firms cluster to reduce the costs of moving goods, but this force no longer appears to be important in driving urban success. Instead, modern cities are far more dependent on the role that density can play in speeding the flow of ideas. Finally, urban economics has some insights to offer related topics such as growth theory, national income accounts, public economics, and housing prices.