Abstract Motivated by wide cross-sectional variations in intensity of care that are unrelated to quality of care, researchers and policymakers commonly claim that healthcare providers waste considerable resources, engaging in so-called “flat-of-the-curve” medicine. A key yet elusive prediction of this hypothesis is that providers ought to be able to cut back on care without sacrificing quality. This article examines the effects of a particular form of provider cutbacks—those generated by physicians working in high-pressure peer group environments. Using expansive, time-stamped discharge data from 137 hospital-based emergency departments, I document that physicians systematically alter their pace and intensity of care across frequently shuffled peer groups. Peer groups that induce a physician to work faster also induce her to order fewer tests and spend less money. Contrary to the flat-of-the-curve hypothesis, these cutbacks lead to large reductions in quality of care. This evidence, paired with the fact that slower physicians do not produce better average outcomes, suggests that cross-physician differences in resource utilization reflect substantial differences in physician productivity within a hospital.

Abstract We study a 2008 policy reform in which Medicare revised its hospital payment system to better reflect patients’ severity of illness. We construct a simulated instrument that predicts a hospital’s policy-induced change in reimbursement using pre-reform patients and postreform rules. The reform led to large persistent changes in Medicare payment rates across hospitals. Hospitals that faced larger gains in Medicare reimbursement increased the volume of Medicare patients they treated. The estimates imply a volume elasticity of 1.2. To accommodate greater volume, hospitals increased nurse employment, but also lowered length of stay.