Using novel shadow bank funding data, I find that shadow banks are funded by the very banks they compete with when originating mortgages. Evidence suggests that banks have market power in the upstream market for shadow banks’ funding, which in turn softens mortgage market competition through their strategic behaviors in both markets. I build and calibrate a quantitative model of vertical integration and competition to show that those consumers who would most benefit from shadow bank services are the ones to bear the costs. Secondary market innovation could increase downstream competition by reducing shadow banks’ reliance on their competitors.

Houses with higher value uncertainty receive less mortgage credit: mortgages backed by these houses are more likely to be rejected, have higher interest rates, and have lower loan-to-price ratios. The relationship between house value uncertainty and credit availability is driven partly by a classic channel in which uncertainty lowers debt recovery rates, and partly by a novel channel where more uncertain appraisals make regulatory constraints on loan size more likely to bind. We build a structural model to quantify the effects of each channel, and show how a shift toward computerized asset appraisals could influence credit access.

We develop a conceptual framework and an empirical methodology to analyze the effect of rising interest rates on the value of U.S. bank assets and bank stability. We mark-to-market the value of banks’ assets due to interest rate increases from Q1 2022 to Q1 2023, revealing an average decline of 10 %, totaling about $2 trillion in aggregate. We present a model illustrating how asset value declines due to higher rates can lead to self-fulfilling solvency runs even when banks’ assets are fully liquid. Banks with high asset losses, low capital, and, critically, high uninsured leverage are most fragile. A case study of the failed Silicon Valley Bank confirms the model insights. Our empirical measures of bank fragility suggest that, in the absence of regulatory intervention, many U.S. banks would have been at risk of self-fulfilling solvency runs.