We examine whether spin-offs or divestitures cause improvements in conglomerate investment efficiency. At issue are endogeneity of these restructuring decisions and correct measurement of investment efficiency. Endogeneity is a problem because the factors that induce firms to spin off or divest divisions may also improve investment efficiency; measurement error is a problem because efficiency measures employ Tobin’s q as a noisy proxy for investment opportunities. We find important differences between firms that divest or spin off and a control sample. After accounting for these differences and for measurement error in q, we find no evidence of improvements in investment efficiency.

Using a broad range of uncertainty measures, we show that uncertainty dramatically slows down firms’ adjustments toward their optimal capital structure. At the upper bound, the estimated speed of leverage adjustments almost halves when uncertainty is high. High quality institutions (common law legal origin, more disclosure to congress and/or to the public, and higher public sector ethics) and presidential political systems offset some of the adverse effects of uncertainty on leverage adjustments. The financial crisis has altered the relationships among uncertainty, adjustment speeds, and a country's institutions; more so for countries with weak institutions and parliamentary systems.

Political environment is an important determinant of financial intermediation costs, which eventually affects the external financing patterns of firms. Political gyrations create policy uncertainty, which increases the information risk, weakens the investor demand, and reduces the offer size. This raises the securities' placement costs for the financial intermediaries, who pass on these costs to the issuing firms in the form of higher underwriter spreads. The issuance costs for new equity and debt capital increase, leading to lower leverage. Simultaneous equation analysis of financing, investment, and cash policies reveals that this channel is distinct from previously documented effects of policy uncertainty on corporate outcomes.

We analyze the changes in cash holding policies of S&P 500 firms from before to after their inclusion in the index. One year after inclusion, their mean industry-adjusted cash holdings decline by nearly 32% from the year before inclusion. Several factors explain this decline. The precautionary motive for cash subsides due to these firms becoming more visible, less uncertain, and less constrained to raise cheap external capital. Corporate governance deteriorates after inclusion due to increased managerial entrenchment, which leads to a reduction in cash as suggested by the free cash flow hypothesis. Most index firms face diminishing investment opportunities and decreasing capital expenditures, which implies a lesser need for cash holdings related to the transaction motive.