Abstract We explore the impact of investors’ beliefs on cryptocurrency demand and prices using new individual-level survey data and a structural characteristics-based demand model with differentiated cryptocurrencies and heterogeneous investors. We show that younger individuals with lower incomes are more optimistic about the future value of cryptocurrencies, as are late investors. We identify the model combining observable beliefs with an instrumental variable strategy that exploits variation in the production of different cryptocurrencies. Counterfactual analyses quantify the impact on portfolio allocations and equilibrium prices of (i) (regulating) entry of late optimistic investors, and (ii) growing concerns among investors about the sustainability of energy-intensive proof-of-work cryptocurrencies. (JEL: D84, G11, G41)

Abstract We present a new class of methods for identification and inference in dynamic models with serially correlated unobservables, which typically imply that state variables are econometrically endogenous. In the context of Industrial Organization, these state variables often reflect econometrically endogenous market structure. We propose the use of Generalized Instrument Variables methods to identify those dynamic policy functions that are consistent with instrumental variable (IV) restrictions. Extending popular “two-step” methods, these policy functions then identify a set of structural parameters that are consistent with the dynamic model, the IV restrictions and the data. We provide computed illustrations to both single-agent and oligopoly examples. We also present a simple empirical analysis that, among other things, supports the counterfactual study of an environmental policy entailing an increase in sunk costs.

Although an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of common values, formal evidence has been limited by the problem of auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. We develop an empirical approach for first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry. We show that important features of the model are nonparametrically identified and apply a semiparametric estimation approach to data from US offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We find that common values, affiliated private information, and unobserved heterogeneity are all present. Failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity obscures the evidence of common values. We examine implications of our estimates for the interaction between affiliation, the winner’s curse, the auction rules, and the number of bidders in determining the aggressiveness of bidding and seller revenue.