By examining required rates of return, we study how shareholders perceive stronger stakeholder orientation arising under the adoption of constituency statutes. Constituency statutes decrease (increase) the cost of equity for firms operating in high- (low-) competition industries. For firms in high-competition industries, constituency statutes increase future cash flows and performance resilience to negative industry downturns, suggesting that constituency statutes facilitate CSR activities for product differentiation in competitive industries. In contrast, for firms in low-competition industries, constituency statutes reduce future cash flows and increase tail risks, suggesting that constituency statutes shield managerial agency problems from discipline.

Seminal theories of the firm posit that firm ownership is allocated to minimize contractual inefficiencies. Yet, it remains unclear how much the optimal ownership choice affects firm performance in practice. This paper provides a first quantification of the gains from optimal ownership within multinational firms by exploiting a major liberalization of China’s policy restrictions on foreign ownership. The liberalization allowed previously restricted firms to become fully foreign-owned. We find that these reoptimized ownership choices raise firm output by 40% and productivity by 7.5% on average. An extended property-rights theory of the multinational firm rationalizes these effects and their heterogeneity.

Leveraging the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s annual random inspection exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the risk scrutiny of preventive regulatory enforcement creates regulatory uncertainty about inspected firms to business partners, leading them to reduce the provision of trade credit. Reduced access to trade credit is more pronounced for firms with weak bargaining power, high opacity, or low financial resilience. Reduced access is also evident in both ‘compliant’ and non-compliant firms, though the reduction gradually subsides as uncertainty dissipates in different ways for the two types of inspected firms. Our findings uncover an important unintended effect of preventive regulation and have implications for policy making.