Dividends are clustered in increments of 5, such as 25, 50, and 75. Firms that gravitate towards these ‘prominent’ amounts have lower operating performance and lower annual five-factor alphas of 77 b.p. Consistent with agency frictions that lead to lazy decisions, clustering effects are stronger for entrenched firms, with more market power, and less shareholder activism. Dividend increases also cluster more than cuts, consistent with saliency bias. In a counterfactual exercise, we find no similar patterns in a sample of ADRs. Our results complement a number of recent studies showing the economic importance of simple decision heuristics.

This article examines the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs) in a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between 1990 and 1995 and its potential impact on firm value. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, we find a positive relation between firm value and the use of FCDs. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for firms with exposure to exchange rates and is on average 4.87% of firm value. We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hedging causes an increase in firm value.

This paper examines the effect of recent market reforms on the competitive structure of the Nasdaq. Our results show that changes in inventory and information costs cannot explain the post‐reform decrease in bid‐ask spreads. We interpret this as evidence that the reforms have reduced Nasdaq dealers' rents. Additionally, we find that the difference between NYSE and Nasdaq spreads have been greatly diminished with the new rules. Further, the reforms have resulted in an exit, ceteris paribus , from the industry for market making. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that the reforms have improved competition on the Nasdaq.

We test whether bank loans change public bond yields. A 25% increase in bank debt raises bond yields by 8 bps, reflecting a trade-off between the benefits of bank cross-monitoring and higher bond risk. This effect is smaller for firms with no credit default swaps (CDSs) and with junk debt—scenarios where bank monitoring is most valuable. It is unlikely that firms with bank debt are riskier, because they are less likely to be downgraded and have lower loan spreads. We find similar results using a natural experiment around the 2014 oil shock. Our results highlight how bond yields depend on incentive conflicts among creditors.

Investment spending by US public firms is highly concentrated. The 100 largest spenders account for 60% of total capital expenditures and drive most of the variation in aggregate investment. This high concentration creates a disconnect between the average public firm and macroeconomic aggregates. For large firms, cash flow remains the primary driver of investment spending and has not declined in importance as it has for smaller public firms. The cash flowing to big spenders provides a better forecast of future investment opportunities than noisy proxies for Tobin's q even though these firms are not financially constrained. These results suggest that, at least for the largest spenders, it is unlikely that measurement error drives the significance of cash flow. Our results are also inconsistent with recent models that predict higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for small young growth firms and suggest that cash flow is still the most important determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations in investment spending.

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.

We use a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. stocks to test whether capital market frictions have an effect on stock prices and corporate decisions. We find that an increase in short-selling activity causes prices to fall, and that small firms react to these lower prices by reducing equity issues and investment. These results not only provide evidence that short-selling constraints affect asset prices, but also confirm that short-selling activity has a causal impact on financing and investment decisions.

We provide empirical evidence that a firm's overall visibility with investors, as measured by its product market advertising, has important consequences for the stock market. Specifically we show that firms with greater advertising expenditures, ceteris paribus, have a larger number of both individual and institutional investors, and better liquidity of their common stock. Our findings are robust to a variety of methodological approaches and to various measures of liquidity. These results suggest that the investors' degree of familiarity with a firm may affect its cost of capital and consequently its value.

This paper examines the growth of electronic communication networks (ECNs) and their competitive impact on the Nasdaq. We find that the development of these alternative trading platforms is associated with tighter quoted, effective, and relative bid–ask spreads, greater depths, and less concentrated markets. Further, our results show that an increase in ECN trading may have caused some traditional market makers (wholesaler and national retail dealers) to exit the market for market making. Overall, our results suggest that ECNs provide a source of competition to traditional Nasdaq dealers.

Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility spiked nearly fivefold during the Internet boom of the late 1990s, dwarfing in magnitude a moderately increasing trend. While some researchers argue that this rise in idiosyncratic risk was the result of changes in the characteristics of public firms, others argue that it was driven by the changing sentiment of irrational traders. We present evidence that the marketwide decline in maturity of the typical public firm can explain most of the increase in firm-specific risk during the Internet boom. Controlling for firm maturity, we find no evidence that investor sentiment drives idiosyncratic risk throughout the Internet boom.