Sell-side analysts rate on a particular type of behavioral curve: recency. Although they claim to use objective criteria (like expected raw, market-adjusted, or industry-adjusted returns), we find that, even after controlling for these claims, their recommendations on a particular stock are negatively influenced by their assessment of the quality of the few other stocks they have rated that month. This recency bias has price implications. The next day's alpha of a sophisticated trading strategy that incorporates this bias is about 40 % higher compared to the alpha of an unsophisticated strategy that uses rating information only.

We develop an approach to identify whether recent technological advancements—such as the rise of commercial satellite-based macro estimates—can provide an alternative to government data. We measure the extent to which satellite estimates affect the value of a government macro announcement using its asset price impact. Our identification relies on cloud cover, which prevents satellites from observing economic activity at a few key hubs. Applying our approach, we find that some satellite estimates are now so effective that markets are no longer surprised by government announcements. Our results point to a future in which the resolution of macro uncertainty is smoother and governments have less control over macro information.

This study investigates how uncertainty affects firms’ target capital structure using a panel data set of U.S. public manufacturers between 2003 and 2018 and finds that high-uncertainty firms have 10.1 (8.1) percentage points lower mean book (market) targets than low-uncertainty firms. This study also shows that the uncertainty effect on leverage targets is greater than the impact of firm size, market-to-book ratio, assets tangibility, R&D intensity, and industry median leverage, making uncertainty the most critical among all time-varying determinants of leverage targets. Further, this study finds that heightened uncertainty decreases debt tax shields, increases potential financial distress costs, and exacerbates debtholder–shareholder conflicts, thereby leading to a lower optimal or target leverage ratio.