This study examines whether the potential for hold-up in supply chains influences the extent of process integration and information sharing between partners. The analysis uses performance scorecards and financial performance data collected from a major manufacturer regarding its contractual arrangements with 156 distributors. I find that distributors engage in less extensive process integration and information sharing with the manufacturer as the potential for hold-up increases, measured by the asymmetry of interdependence between partners. I also find that distributors engage in more extensive process integration and information sharing as the potential for hold-up decreases, measured by the magnitude of interdependence between partners. Additional evidence shows that more extensive process integration and information sharing have favorable financial performance implications for supply chain partners and enhance the likelihood of distributor contract renewal. Overall, the results indicate that the potential for hold-up can restrict the performance benefits available to partners from developing more extensive supply chain integration practices. Data Availability: A confidentiality agreement restricts data availability. Some data have been modified by a common factor to preserve research site confidentiality.

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation Raffi J. Indjejikian, Michal Matějka, Jason D. Schloetzer; Target Ratcheting and Incentives: Theory, Evidence, and New Opportunities. The Accounting Review 1 July 2014; 89 (4): 1259–1267. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50745 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

We find that firms are less likely to disclose information regarding a negative economic event for which the firm is likely to be blamed than a negative event for which the firm is likely to be perceived as blameless. We identify 383 material negative events (casualty accidents, oil spills, catastrophes, investor class action lawsuits) and find that firms are approximately four times less likely to disclose information following a negative blamed event than a blameless event. Consistent with disclosure of blamed events resulting in greater costs to the firm, we find that firms that disclose after a blamed, but not a blameless, event experience greater reputation and litigation costs than firms that do not disclose. We find that blame attribution provides incremental information over manager career concerns in the disclosure decision. These findings suggest that an event-specific factor—blame attribution—affects firms' propensity to provide disclosures about negative economic events. Data Availability: The list of 383 material negative economic events is available upon request.