This paper investigates the impact of rank-and-file employees on corporate innovation. We show that paying higher relative wages to rank-and-file employees promotes better innovation outcomes in terms of patent quantity and quality. This effect is more significant among firms with large proportions of skilled employees, industries with high levels of R&D intensity, provinces with competitive local labor markets, and non-SOEs. Further analyses reveal that efficiency wages can serve as an underlying economic channel that fosters innovation by retaining and attracting valuable human capital and stimulating their working enthusiasm. Finally, we show that technological innovation is a mechanism through which rank-and-file employees affect productivity growth and thereby affect the economy.

Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.