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Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

Journal of Financial Economics 2001 61(3), 311-344
We consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to misrepresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. We show that in the optimal mechanism firms always underinvest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule. We make a number of novel cross-sectional predictions about the severity of the underinvestment problem and the composition of managerial compensation contracts. We also find that firms will optimally give greater performance-based pay (at the expense of fixed wages) to managers of higher quality projects to mitigate the incentive for managers to overstate project quality. Managers may thus receive greater performance-based pay because they manage higher quality projects, not that greater performance-based pay causes firm value to increase.

Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(3), 1089-1118
We examine the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firm's investment opportunities. The firm's investment and compensation policy must balance the manager's incentives to provide entrepreneurial effort and to report private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in high-quality projects.

Capital Budgeting in Multidivision Firms: Information, Agency, and Incentives

Review of Financial Studies 2004 17(3), 739-767
We examine optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation in a firm with two investment projects (divisions) each run by a risk-neutral manager who can provide (i) (unverifiable) information about project quality and (ii) (unverifiable) access to value-enhancing, but privately costly resources. The optimal managerial compensation contract offers greater performance pay and a lower salary when managers report that their project is higher quality. The firm generally underinvests in capital and managers underutilize resources (relative to first-best). We also derive cross-sectional predictions about the sensitivity of investment in one division to the quality of investment opportunities in the other division, and the relative importance of division-level and firm-level performance-based pay in managerial compensation contracts.

Momentum and Reversals When Overconfident Investors Underestimate Their Competition

Review of Financial Studies 2021 34(1), 351-393
We develop a model in which overconfident investors overestimate their own signal quality but are skeptical of others’ Investors who are initially uninformed believe that early-informed investors have learned little, leading the former investors to provide excess liquidity, which, in turn, causes underreaction and short-run momentum. Skeptical investors can also react to stale information, causing momentum, followed by reversals. Hence, skepticism generates both momentum and reversals; the latter are amplified if investors overassess their own signal precision. We explain how long-run reversals can disappear while shorter-term momentum prevails, provide empirical implications, and link momentum to liquidity and price efficiency.

Short-Term Reversals and Longer-Term Momentum around the World: Theory and Evidence

Review of Financial Studies 2025 38(12), 3673-3728
Stock returns exhibit reversals at short horizons but slowly transition to momentum over longer horizons. To help understand this pattern, we develop a multiperiod model with short- and long-horizon noise traders, and active investors who underreact to information they do not themselves produce. The model accords with the transition from reversals to momentum and yields the following novel predictions: (a) attenuated reversals after earnings announcements, (b) a negative relation between monthly reversal and longer-term momentum profits across economies and time, and (c) larger reversals when there is more noise trading. Empirical analysis using U.S. and international data supports these predictions.