This paper analyzes the relationship between online social networks and inter-firm investment similarity. Using mutual friendships of senior officers on Sina Weibo as proxies for online social connections, we find that companies, whose senior officers share online connections, exhibit more similar levels of capital investments. In addition, the baseline result is robust in subsamples of senior officers' first like on Weibo, and continue to hold for a battery of robustness and endogeneity tests. One possible underlying mechanism through which social networks influence corporate investment similarity is that senior officers learn privileged information from their social connections, which is supported by examining the interaction effect of analyst coverage and online social connections. We further show that this investment similarity is more pronounced in the condition that company pairs are connected by more reputable senior officers, or in the case of under-investing.

Using the timeliness of misstatement discovery as a proxy for audit quality, we examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit quality in a setting that alleviates the endogeneity problem endemic to this line of research. We find that longer audit firm tenure leads to less timely discovery and correction of misstatements, which is consistent with a negative effect of long auditor tenure on audit quality. In addition, using the non-voluntary auditor change following the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 as a natural experiment, we show that the misstatements of its former clients were discovered faster than those of comparable companies that retained their auditors throughout the misstatement. This finding speaks to the benefit of a fresh look by a new auditor. An extended analysis shows that longer auditor tenure also leads to misstatements of greater magnitudes, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has mitigated, but not eliminated, the negative effect of long auditor tenure. Last, we show that the negative association between auditor tenure and timely discovery of misstatements is mainly present in the first ten years of an audit engagement. Our study has implications for regulators who continue to express concern regarding lengthy auditor-client engagement.

This study develops a two-sided matching structural model to examine whether government venture capitals (GVCs) crowd out private venture capitals (PVCs) by comparing the pre-money economic valuation of observed and counterfactual investments. The structural model also allows us to study the impacts of GVCs on the post-investment performance of the funded companies. Using China's VC market data between 2000 and 2020, we find that GVC-funded companies are those neglected by PVCs, and the potential economic performance of GVC-funded companies is inferior to that of PVC-funded ones. It means that the data do not support the crowding out conjecture. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the potential innovativeness of GVC-funded companies is higher than that of PVC-funded companies, indicating that GVCs bridge the equity gap left by PVCs in innovative companies. Regarding the impacts on companies' post-investment performance, GVCs are not significantly different from PVCs in improving companies' economic performance, and they are better than PVCs in improving companies' innovative performance. We also explore the impacts of different types of GVCs, the impacts of the co-investment between GVCs and PVCs, and the impacts of GVCs on companies in different stages of development.

This paper develops an overlapping generations model of optimal rebalancing where agents differ in age and risk tolerance. Equilibrium rebalancing is driven by a leverage effect that influences levered and unlevered agents in opposite directions, an aggregate risk tolerance effect that depends on the distribution of wealth, and an intertemporal hedging effect. After a negative macroeconomic shock, relatively risk-tolerant investors sell risky assets, while more risk-averse investors buy them. Owing to interactions of leverage and changing wealth, however, all agents have higher exposure to aggregate risk after a negative macroeconomic shock and lower exposure after a positive shock.